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Abstract 
Modern communication and information technologies have proven to be strongly 
correlated with an increased labor productivity growth in the recent years in the US.  New 
business models utilizing those technologies have emerged so fast that management 
reviews describing them have rapidly transformed into a very lucrative business.  
However, the whole electronic business phenomenon is still in its infancy and its real 
impact remains difficult to evaluate. 
This thesis focuses on the impact of contemporary business models on the Lean 
enterprise.  It first examines the Internet phenomenon through the lens of four case 
studies: Dell Corporation, eBay, Inc., Linux and Enron Corporation.  From these case 
studies, a set of principles is extracted that is further used to scope e-World business 
trends.  The e-World trends are then put side by side with the Lean overarching principles 
and the interactions between the two sets of principles are analyzed in d t il. 
As a result of this analysis, a clear overlap between e-World principles and Lean is first 
established: this thesis not only shows how the e-World facilitates Lean but also how 
Lean is an enabler to the e-World.  Second, this research demonstrates inconsistencies 
between observed trends from the e-World and the Lean principles.  Third, the key Lean 
concept of value originating from a customer-pull is challenged by recent business trends.  
This thesis supports a definition of value emerging from a company’s core competency to 
understand and process its customer’s information. 
Finally, the research examines the technological, institutional, and legal challenges of 
implementing the observed e-World trends in other industries.  It then concentrates on 
organizational issues and questions the viability of traditional hierarchical structures.  
Lastly it explores people implications and the role of human resource management. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“A consensus is emerging that something fundamental has changed [in the 
economic system]” 
Jorgenson and Stiroh, the American Economic Review, 2000a) 
According to many academics and politicians (including for instance Alan Greenspan and 
Bill Clinton), we are living through one of the select eras in history where advancing 
technologies and changing organizations are transforming econ mics, society and life. 
As a matter of fact, the performance of the U.S. economy over the last decade has 
astonished economists.  Several studies1 how that labor productivity growth is rising, 
which could explain why the economy did not overheat (yet), by way of higher inflation.  
Equally impressive annual growth figures have only occurred for short periods of 
American economic history (typically after recessions). 
Most scholars within Jorgenson and Stiroh’s “consensus” see the progress of information 
and communication technologies as the critical cause for changes in the economy, 
particularly for a potential rise in productivity across sectors. 
“So, the Internet revolution is not a myth then? Probably not. This thesis is a humble 
attempt to understand why. 
                                         
1 E.g. OECD, Economics Department (A post-mortem on economic outlook projections, December 2000) 
and other recent studies (Jorgenson and Stiroh, Raising the speed limit: US economic growth in the 
information age, The American Economic Review, October 2000) 
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1 The Internet Phenomenon 
1.1 Foreword 
The following words will be very frequently used.  Even though some of them have 
already become common usage words, most of them still lack a precise definition.  For 
that matter and for the context of this thesis, they are defined below. 
Internet: Internet is used as shorthand to include the whole cluster of technologies that 
depend upon and enhance it such as Internet, Intranet, WWW, Email, Electronic Fund 
transfer, Electronic Forms but also Technical Data Interchange (CAD/CAM/CAE) or 
Electronic Data Interchange (Request For Quotes, Production Controls, etc.). 
B2B: Business-to-business (B2B) is a term that refers to commerce between companies 
conducted over the Internet. 
B2C: Business-to-consumer (B2C) is a term that relates to commerce between companies 
and their end-customers and conducted over the Internet2.
1.2 The Internet craze 
In 1991, the Internet had less than 3 million users around the world and its application to 
e-commerce was non-existent.  Today, the number of Internet users is approximately 
407.1 million3 and GartnerGroup forecasts close to $1 trillion for US online trade in 
20014.  As illustrated in the next section, Internet statistics exhibit staggering figures.  
                                         
2C2B (customer to business) and C2C (customer to customer) are also in use. eBay would be an example of 
C2C service whereas Priceline.com’s enormous success has shown that C2B represents a viable market 
opportunity.  We hardly mention the huge B2C market in this th s s but it was the most rapidly adopted 
business model. Examples of B2C include Amazon.com, Barnesandnoble.com, eToys, CDnow. 
3As of November 2000 according to Nua Research 
http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index.html, quoted by http://www.esa.doc.gov/de2k2.htm - 
The given figure is different from the DOC’s because it was updated. 
4Another interesting figure is the number of webpages: according to Inktomi and the NEC Research 
Institute, the amount of information available online has increased ten-fold from early 1997 to early 2000, 
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The goal of this thesis is to improve our understanding of this pervasive phenomenon.  Of 
course, it would be unrealistic to try and describe the Internet as a whole.  Our interest is 
placed on how the Internet impacts the industry and the way business is conducted with a 
special emphasis on the Lean enterprise. 
In a presentation to Wall Street analysts in June 1999, Lou Gerstner, Chairman and CEO 
of IBM, described the new “dot-com” companies as “fireflies before the storm – all 
stirred up, throwing off sparks”.  But he continued: “The storm that is arriving – the real 
disturbance in the force – is when the thousands and thousands of institutions that exist 
today seize the power of this global computing and communication infrastructure and use 
it to transform themselves.  That’s the real revolution.”5 
This thesis is an attempt to describe the “real revolution” Mr. Gerstner talks about. 
1.3 A statistics maze on the Internet craze 
One of the first questions that people usually seek to answer when researching about a 
new phenomenon is: how big is it?  Not surprisingly most research groups, investment 
banks and consulting groups have attempted to size the tangible (i.e. monetary) Internet, 
namely B2B and B2C commerce. 
Exploring the past is a difficult exercise.  Missing, imprecise or even contradictory 
information make it very challenging, not to mention the endless variety of 
interpretations for one single piece of information.  Exploring the present can be an even 
more demanding assignment and is indeed very tricky when it comes to estimating the 
size of a constantly evolving target like Internet commerce. 
                                                                                                                    
to more than a billion discrete pages.  Foster City, Calif., January 18, 2000 
http://www.inktomi.com/new/press/2000/billion.html 
5 The Economist, Business and the Internet survey, June 26 1999, 34 
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In November 1999, a report from Goldman Sachs estimated that the B2B market in the 
United States would grow to approximately $1.5 trillion by 20046.  In February 2000, 
Forrester Research forecasted that B2B transactions would reach $2.7 trillion in 2004 
while B2C transactions would total up to $184 billion in the same year.  In April 2000, 
Forrester Research7 revised its forecast and announced $7 trillion for electronic 
commerce revenues by 2004.  In September 2000, a report from the Boston Consulting 
Group8 stated that B2B commerce in the US is set to become a $4.8 trillion market by 
2004, up from $1.2 trillion in 2000.  In October 2000, Jupiter Communication announced 
that B2B commerce would experience astounding growth over the next five years, rising 
to $6.3 trillion in 2005 from $336 billion in 20009 (see Figure 1) 
Figure 1: Evolution of Online Trade Projections 
                                         
6 Goldman Sachs Investment Research, B2B: 2B or Not 2B?, November 12, 1999, 2 
7 Forrester Research, April 19, 2000 http://www.forrester.com/ER/Press/Release/0,1769,277,FF.html 
8 Boston Consulting Group September, 8 2000 
http://www.bcg.com/media_center/media_press_release_subpage22.asp 
9 Jupiter Communication, New York, October 2 2000, 
http://jup.com/company/pressrelease.jsp?doc=pr001002 
 
Time Evolution of Online Trade Projections
1.5
2.7
7
4.8
8.5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
November 1999
Goldman Sachs
February 2000
Forrester Research
April 2000
Forrester Research
September 2000
Boston Consulting
Group
March 2001
GartnerGroup
Source
$
 t
ri
lli
o
n
The E-World as an Enabler to Lean 
 
15 
The latest report available on this highly debated question of sizing B2B commerce was 
published by GartnerGroup in March 200110.  Although the economic downturn will 
negatively affect the growth of B2B, Gartner predicts that the global B2B market will 
still be worth $8.5 trillion in 2005, up from $433 billion in 2000.  Year 2001’s total is 
expected to reach $919 billion, increasing to $1.9 trillion in 2002.  The total for 2003 is 
projected to reach $3.6 trillion, followed by further growth to $6 trillion in 2004 (see 
Table 1). 
Table 1: B2B Online Trade Projections - Source: Gartner Group, March 15, 2001 
2 The Lean phenomenon 
2.1 Definition of Lean 
"Becoming lean implies a journey.  We will reach our destination when we apply 
the philosophies underlying lean to develop our own lean systems.  There's no 
reason not to start trying.  There are no experts, just people with more experience.  
The longer we wait, the more experience our competitors will have when we 
start." 
JOHN Y. SHOOK, Director, Japan Technology Management Program, 
University of Michigan 
Giving a more precise definition of what “Lean” exactly is could be the subject of a 
whole thesis.  Different schools of thoughts exist and support their own interpretation of 
                                         
10GartnerGroup, March 15 2001, http://www4.gartner.com/5_about/press_room/pr20010313a.html 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Millions of US 
dollars 49,877 150,050 433,300 919,0001,929,0003,632,0005,950,0008,530,000
% growth
Year to Year 201% 189% 112% 110% 88% 64% 43%
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the concept.  For the purposes of this thesis, a brief introduction of where the term Lean 
comes from and how it led the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) at MIT to develop the 
Lean Enterprise Model and its 12 overarching principles will be more than sufficient. 
2.2 Brief history of Lean 
Ironically the Lean manufacturing system really started with Henry Ford.  That is a bit 
simplistic but in fact the moving assembly line was the ideal model on which Toyota 
based their production system back in the 1940s.  A moving asse bly line is 
continuously flowing, like a river, and the ideal for the Toyota Production System (TPS) 
is to keep all material continuously flowing.  Anything that prevents the flow of material 
is waste or muda in Japanese.  Unfortunately Ford Motor Company moved away from the 
original vision of Henry Ford.  The focus on flow through the River Rouge complex 
became a focus on getting out masses of Model Ts and keeping all equipment busy, 
whether the next process was ready for more product or not.  Inventory built up as 
"process villages" built at their own tempo regardless of what other processes needed. 
"Ford made a dramatic wrong turn at his new Rouge complex.  He maintained the 
assembly track but rearranged his fabrication machinery into process villages.  He 
proceeded to run a push schedule in which growing fluctuations in end-customer
demand and persistent hiccups in upstream production were buffered by a vast 
bank of finished units forced on the dealer network and equally vast buffers of 
parts at every stage of production upstream from assembly.  Thus "flow" 
production (as Ford termed it in 1914) became "mass production". 
James P. Womack11 
In the meantime the Toyota Production System was developing as the first lean 
manufacturing system.  It started on the shopfloor as a solution to a very real and pressing 
problem.  After World War II when Japanese industry was decimated, the Toyoda family 
                                         
11Foreword to: Becoming Lean, edited by Jeffrey Liker (Portland, Oregon: Productivity press) 1997. 
The E-World as an Enabler to Lean 
 
17 
decided to extend Toyota Automatic Loom Company to start an automotive company.  
They had some cash but did not have the infrastructure.  They certainly could not 
compete directly with the established companies like Ford.  So their sole demand was in 
Japan which meant supplying small quantities, with high variety while Ford was selling 
any color Model T you wanted as long as it was black.  Toyota also had to rely on outside 
supplier partners to make the capital investment needed to get in business. 
Under these conditions, Taiichi Ohno (father of the Toyota Production System) was 
given the assignment of catching up with American companies in productivity at a time 
when they were behind by a factor of ten.  Ohno drew upon a number of ideas imported 
from the West and a lot of experimentation to ultimately develop TPS.  At the time, 
Toyota Automatic Loom had invented a loom that stopped when there was a quality 
problem (e.g., a thread breaking).  This was the basis for the TPS concept of jidoka, 
roughly translated as built-in quality.  Ford’s moving assembly line was the model of 
continuously flowing material and Toyota managers all diligently read Henry Ford’s 
books.  For example, in the book Today and Tomorrow12, all the basic concepts of lean 
manufacturing are laid out.  Ohno learned of the American supermarket system and how 
a version was being implemented at Lockheed.  The supermarket concept was to place 
out a small quantity of all the products your customer might want and replenish those 
items as they are used: a pull system.  (http://www.acq-ref.navy.mil/wcp/tps_ono.pdf, 
http://www.optiprise.com). 
The Toyota Production System (TPS) was developed between 1945 and 1970 and it is 
still evolving today.  The 1973 oil crisis hit Japan at least as hard as it hit America and 
Europe.  By 1974, Japan’s economy had collapsed to a state of zero growth.  At Toyota 
Motor Company, although profits suffered, greater earnings were sustained in 1975, 1976 
and 1977 than at other Japanese companies.  The widening gap between Toyota and other 
Japanese companies opened the eyes of others in Japan to this phenomenon called the 
Toyota Production System and it began spreading rapidly in Japan.
                                         
12 Autobiography from Henry Ford 
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In the U.S., the auto industry awoke when The Machine that Changed the World13 was 
published highlighting the great accomplishments of Toyota and the huge gap between 
Japanese quality and productivity and auto companies in the West.  Many differences 
were factors of ten, like the original gap between Toyota and Ford but reversed.  That 
book coined the term "lean manufacturing" because Toyota was doing more with less of 
everything: less space, less people, less capital and less inventory. 
2.3 “Lean Thinking” 
Two of the authors of The Machine that Changed the World, mack and Jones worked 
as consultants to numerous U.S. and European companies that had begun to implement 
Lean principles and practices during the late 1980s and through the mid-1990s.  These 
experiences were documented in their book Lean Thinking14.  After working with many 
companies, the authors/consultants began to see a generic framework for successfully 
implementing Lean in Western companies.  This amounted to a restatement of the Lean 
framework as practiced by Toyota, designed to be more compatible with Western 
practices and management approaches. Womack and Jones15 perceived that there are five 
general principles of Lean thinking. 
Value — The starting point for Lean thinking is “value” as defined by the end customer. 
Value is defined in terms of specific products and services having specific capabilities 
offered at specific prices to specific customers. 
Value Stream — A “value stream” is the set of all specific end-to-end, linked actions, 
processes, and functions necessary to transform raw materials into a finished product in 
the hands of the customer.  Service after the sale is included in the value stream.  
Mapping the value stream for each product provides a bas s for performing an in-depth 
analysis of each of the individual actions in the value stream.  Each action is classified 
                                         
13 by Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990, from a research conducted through the International Motor Vehicle 
Program (IMVP) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
14 Womack and Jones 1996 
15Lean Thinking, 1996, 16-26 
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into one of the following categories: (1) it unambiguously creates value, (2) it creates no 
value but is unavoidable given the current capabilities within the company (type one 
muda16), and (3) it creates no value and can be eliminated immediately (type two 
muda16).  Actions in categories (1) and (2) are analyzed further through the use f value 
engineering, in an effort to improve the action as much as possible, eliminating 
unnecessary expenditures of resources. 
Flow — Once the wasteful actions along the value stream have been eliminated to the 
maximum extent possible, the next step according to Lean principles is to make the 
remaining, value-cr ating steps “flow.”  The primary challenge is to discard the batch-
and-queue mentality prevalent in mass production and install small-lot production.  The 
ultimate goal is to implement batch sizes of a single unit.  Flow is best achieved by 
discarding traditional functional organizations, replacing them with integrated product 
teams organized along the value stream. 
Pull — Conceptually, the customer “pulls” the product from the enterprise rather than th  
enterprise pushing the product onto the customer.  This “pulling” action cascades up the 
value stream, stage by stage, all the way to the supply chain.  A production system 
organized in this manner is said to be a “just-in-time” (JIT) system.  Establishing a JIT 
system involves the use of “kanbans17” and a system of total quality that roots out all 
defective work.  JIT is supported by production smoothing, standardization of operations, 
reduction in setup times, single piece flow and rearrangement of production operations 
into work cells. 
Perfection — Companies that have implemented the principles and practices of Lean 
find that there is no end to the process of reducing waste of all kinds and continually 
improving the product and service delivered to the customer.  Consequently, there are on-
                                         
16 Muda is a Japanese term meaning waste. Refer to Lean Thinking, 1996, Preface, 9.  Womack and Jones 
define type one and type two muda15
17Kanban is a Japanese term that means “card, sticker” and usually refers to cards that visually signal the 
upstream stage to produce another unit 
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going reductions in response cycle times, production time, required production space, 
costs, and errors. 
It is important to note that those five principles have been especially applied to the 
production level of the enterprise.  This thesis however adopts LAI’s broader definition 
of Lean.18  LAI views “Lean” not merely as a set of practices for the factory floor but 
rather as a “fundamental change in how the people within an organization think and what 
they value, thus transforming how they behave.”19  In this view, the true potential of Lean 
is at the Enterprise level, where every element of the organization, extending forward to 
the customer and reaching back into its supply chain, applies the Lean concepts.  
Recent information technology developments are having a dramatic impact on the 
manner in which companies may interact with customers, suppliers, partners and other 
potential stakeholders.  Electronic commerce is changing the manner in which enterprises 
deal with suppliers.  The cycle time for ordering, shipping, receiving and paying for 
supplies has been reduced from weeks to days (or in some cases as we will see in the case 
studies, even to hours).  Equally dramatic change is unfolding in B2B interactions, both 
in terms of their nature and speed.  Strategic partnerships can be formed very rapidly in 
response to business opportunities that may be available only briefly.  To play in this fast- 
paced game, enterprises must become much more “forward-focused”, ever ready to move 
swiftly and deftly into the fray. 
                                         
18 The Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) is a research group at MIT. More will be said about LAI in 
CHAPTER 4. 
19Transitioning to a Lean Enterprise: a Guide for Leaders, Volume I: Executive Overview, Lean 
Aerospace Initiative, MIT, September 2000. 
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3 Research outline 
3.1 Motivation 
The Internet acts as a disruptive technology that changes the way we work, live, learn and 
play. What is more, it is doing so at a far greater speed than the other technology 
revolutions of the 20th Century, such as electricity, the telephone and the car. The first 
order impact of the Internet on the way we work in terms of online buying and selling, or 
e-commerce, is obvious. Less understood are the profound changes in the process and 
culture of an enterprise. 
This research seeks to explore the impacts of the Internet on the whole enterprise. 
Emphasis is placed on the Lean attributes of the enterprise, comparing them to 
contemporary business models and showing in what measure they can be both enhanced 
and modified by the Internet. 
3.2 Key questions 
“Where do cash flows come from?” is probably one of the first questions one would ask 
when inquiring about new business models.  For electronic commerce, the past two years 
have shown clear answers to that question.  Companies exhibit varying business models, 
depending on the key products and services they offer and the core sources of e-
commerce revenue in these models include transaction fees, auction-driven commissions, 
advertising, content subscriptions, and software licensing.  Each one of these revenue 
sources could be the subject of a thesis.  Our purpose however is to describe the 
interactions between contemporary, Internet enabled, business models and the Lean 
enterprise.  Key question  nclude: What are the emerging businesses that we can use as 
models to describe today’s e-World trends?  How Lean are those businesses (according to 
the Lean principles of the LEM)?  Are the Lean principles a prerequisite for companies to 
embrace an Internet strategy?  Can Aerospace companies follow the same e-World 
trends?  What lessons can Aerospace companies learn from these trends? 
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3.3 Methodology 
Unlike traditional research, this thesis does not rely on a central data-analysis out of 
which all results should follow.  On the contrary, it is an attempt to shed light on a broad 
subject about which thousands of articles and publications have already been written.  
Indeed, the amount of literature that discusses online commerce is enormous.  In January 
2001, a search on the Lexis-Nexis database for the word “business-to-business” returned 
an average of almost 450 articles per week over the 10 preceding weeks (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Lexis-Nexis database search for "business-to-business" within the Business and Finance 
publication section 
All 450 weekly articles are obviously not relevant to this thesis.  Nonetheless the 
astounding figures add to the craze of the phenomenon and help understand why Internet 
commerce is still so poorly understood. 
The first milestone for this research consisted in a de facto limited literature review (see 
Reference chapter for a detailed bibliography).  Out of this first step, four major Internet 
cases were identified and examined in more detail.  Putting the four cases side by side 
with the Lean enterprise principles was the second milestone of this research.  The third 
major step was the analysis and thesis development. 
From To Number of 
matching 
publications
1/29/01 2/4/01 477
1/22/01 1/28/01 521
1/15/01 1/21/01 480
1/8/01 1/14/01 602
1/1/01 1/7/01 392
12/25/00 12/31/00 122
12/18/00 12/24/00 515
12/11/00 12/17/00 455
12/4/00 12/10/00 438
11/27/00 12/3/00 441
Total 10 weeks 4443
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4 Chapter outline 
CHAPTER 2 introduces the e-World trends with four case studies: Dell Computer 
Corporation, eBay, Inc., Linux and Enron.  CHAPTER 3 follows with the Internet 
commerce trends in the Aerospace industry and provides with a framework to structure 
the comparison between the e-World trends and the Lean Enterprise.  CHAPTER 4 
defines the Lean principles and the e-World principles and is devoted to a detailed 
comparison of the two sets of principles.  CHAPTER 5 draws on CHAPTER 3 and 
CHAPTER 4 to analyze policy issues and make recommendations to industry leaders. 
Finally CHAPTER 6 reviews the research documented in this thesis.  It first provides a 
brief discussion of the research objectives, key questions and research design.  It then 
summarizes the major findings and discusses possible directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: E-WORLD TRENDS 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Methodology 
At the heart of the logic of this thesis is Professor Charles Fine’s concept of fast 
clockspeed industries serving as model exampls for slow clockspeed industries20.  Fast 
clockspeed industries include for example the Personal Computer industry (product 
technology clockspeed under 6 months) or computer-aided software engineering (product 
technology of about 6 months).  Slow clockspeed industries include the steel industry 
(product technology of 20 to 40 years), the commercial aircraft industry (product 
technology between 10 and 20 years) or the military aircraft industry (product technology 
between 20 and 30 years)21.  For that reason, ur analysis begins with four case studies 
describing contemporary business trends and methods. 
1.2 Classification matrix 
1.2.1 Traditional frameworks 
Considering the multitude of companies that currently use the Internet (which, for short, 
we will refer to as Inter et companies) for business purposes, it is not obvious to limit a 
research sample to four cases.  Several frameworks exist to help classify Internet 
                                         
20 Charles H. Fine, Clockspeed – Winning Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage, Perseus Books, 
1998. 
21 Charles H. Fine, Clockspeed – Winning Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage, Perseus Books, 
1998, 239 
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companies.  The most common looks at the identity of the seller and the buyer and gives 
the four traditional categories B2B (Covisint), B2C (Amazon), C2B (Priceline), C2C 
(eBay).  Steven Kaplan and Mohanbir Sawhney developed another framework, the B2B 
matrix, based on “How” and “What” Internet companies buy22.  “What” companies buy 
is either operating inputs or manufacturing inputs and “How” they buy those inputs is 
either by systematic sourcing or spot sourcing, which leads to four categories: MRO hubs 
(e.g. Ariba), Catalog hubs (e.g. Chemdex), Yield Managers (Employease) and Exchanges 
(e-Steel).  Both frameworks are useful.  The first one however is too broad to really 
understand the business model type under the designation.  The second one, even though 
it provides a more understandable description of each category, is too specific for our 
purposes since it concentrates on B2B commerce.  Consequently Don Tapscott’s 
framework23 was chosen because it combines the quality of the two previously mentioned 
frameworks: comprehensiveness and comprehension. 
1.2.2 Tapscott’s control/value integration matrix23 
Tapscott’s classification matrix differentiates Internet companies along two primary 
dimensions: control (self-organizing or hierarchical) and value integration (low or high). 
Control is about economics.  Some Internet companies are hierarchical; they have a 
leader who controls the content of the value proposition, the pricing, and the flow of 
transactions.  General Motors designs and leads the integrated supply networks to 
produce preconceived products.  Retailers like Amazon.com function hierarchically, 
taking responsibility for product selection, pricing, and customer satisfaction.  Other 
Internet companies self-organize.  The market and its dynamics define the value and price 
of goods and services.  Open-source software follows no management-imposed blueprint, 
because the product evolves through an organic development process open to all 
programmers.  In stock exchanges and other types of auctions, the participants, not a 
                                         
22 Steven Kaplan and Mohanbir Sawhney, E-Hubs: The New B2B Marketplaces, Harvard Business Review, 
May-June 2000, 99. 
23 Don Tapscott, David Ticoll, Alex Lowi, Digital Capital – Harnessing the power of business webs, 
Harvard Business School Press, 2000, 28. 
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single leader, drive content and price.  Anyone can sell anything on an eBay auction.  
Trading activity in the stock market continually responds to internal and external forces, 
whether a crisis of confidence in Asia, a speech by Alan Greenspan or a stampeding herd 
of institutional investors. 
Some Internet companies focus on high value integration, that is, facilitating the 
production of specific product or service offerings (like cars, computers, consulting 
services) by integrating value contributions from multiple sources.  Tapscott defines 
value as the benefit that a user gains from a good or service.  Dell achieves high value 
integration by taking contributions from many suppliers and turning them into a 
computer.  Other Internet companies focus on selection (low value integration), that is, 
providing a basket of choices rather than a single integrated solution.  Ingram Micro, a 
leading wholesaler of computer hardware and software, does not alter the product 
offering.  It focuses on distributing high-tech products, not making them.  It currently 
offers products from more than 1,500 manufacturers.  In between high and low value 
integration lie services like Instill, a restaurant industry supplier, which aggregates online 
catalogs from food producers, but also manages part of the restaurant supply chain, 
reducing inventory and minimizing stockouts. 
These two parameters (economic control and value integration) define the characteristics 
of the e-World trends we will examine in the next section.  As illustrated in Figu e 2, 
Tapscott uses fives designation to classify Internet ventures: Agoras (e.g. eBay), 
Aggregation (Amazon.com), Value Chain (Dell Computer), Alliance (Linux) and 
Distributive Network (Enron). In an effort to cover most aspects of the e-World, we will 
focus our attention on four cases: Dell Computer Corporation, eBay, Inc., the Linux 
phenomenon and Enron. 
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Figure 2: Tapscott’s control/value integration matrix  
2 Case Study #1: Dell Computer Corporation 
“I believe we have the right business model for the Internet age.” 
-Michael Dell, CEO, Dell Computer Corporation24. 
2.1 Overview of The Dell Computer Corporation 
Michael Dell founded Dell Computer Corporation in 1984 with $1,000 and an 
unprecedented idea in the personal computer industry: bypass the middleman who adds 
little value to the products, and sell custom-built PCs directly to end-users. 
By using this innovative direct-marketing approach and by pioneering the industry's first 
service and support programs, Dell Computer Corporation has est blished itself as one of 
the top vendors of personal computers worldwide and is a premier provider of products 
and services required for customers to build their Internet infrastructures.  Today Dell is 
                                         
24 “Dells paves the Way for a New Level of Direct Economics and Customer Benefits” 14 April, 1997 
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the world’s number one direct seller of computers.  In 16 years, the company's sales have 
grown from $6 million to $32 billion for the past four quarters. 
Since its first international subsidiary opened in the United Kingdom in 1987, Dell has 
opened sales offices in 34 countries around the world, and its approximately 40,000 
employees serve customers worldwide25. 
The latest global innovation to come from Dell is its leadership on the Web.  Dell on-line 
was launched in 1997 and in the first quarter of 1997 Dell reported online sales of 
US$1million.  August 1999 daily online sales had reached $30 million26.  Today Dell’s 
website features about 80 country-specific pages draws $40 million in computer sales 
daily and processes up to half of the company transactions27.   
With an average annual sales increase of almost 60% for the past decade27, Dell is 
acknowledged to be the largest online commercial seller of computer systems. 
The purpose of this case study is to understand the unpreceded success of Dell. 
2.2 The Personal computer market in the 1980s 
In 1980, the majority of computer sold were mainframe computers (about 75% of 
industry volume), the rest were minicomputers.  Within a decade this picture had 
changed.  By 1990, the industry was dominated by personal computers, which accounted 
for 40% of the volume. 
Over the course of a decade, personal computers had zoomed from birth to a $40 billion 
industry in the States.  This growth was fueled by dramatic breakthroughs in processing 
and storage technologies.  The cost of pr cessing a million intructions per second (MIPS) 
                                         
25 From Michael Dell biography, URL: 
http://www.dell.com/us/en/gen/corporate/biography/biography_generic_michael_dell.htm 
26 Center for Asian Business Cases, School of Business, the University of Hong-Kong, “Dell: Selling 
Directly, Globally” 
27 Hoover’s Inc., Dow-Jones Interactive, Dell Computer Corporation – Company background information 
(February 2001) 
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fell from $75,000 in 1980 to $10,000 by 1985 and further down to $2,000 by 199128.  
Along with this breakneck growth also came a tremendous churning of the personal 
computer industry.  Literally, hundreds of manufacturers and distributors entered this 
industry with high hopes for success only to leave as paupers a couple years later.  Even 
those who successfully bore up against this disaster found their margins severely 
decreased by 1991. 
“Computers have become commodities… Once an icon of technological 
wizardry, personal computers have become a commodity… The price of a 
complete computer system is being dragged down to the sum of its parts…And 
customers are less willing to pay for service and hand-holding.” 
-The Economist, November 2, 1991 
Dell Computer Corporation is one of the rare exceptions that weathered the storm 
successfully. 
2.3 The Story of Dell 
The founding companies of the industry (IBM, Compaq, HP) had no other choice but to 
create their computers from scratch.  They needed to manufacture each single component 
themselves: disk drives, memory chips, and application software.  For this reason, all the 
various pieces of the industry had to be vertically integrated within one firm.  Digital 
Equipment, for example, had to become expert in a wide array of components.  These 
activities did not create any value but were unavoidable given the current capabilities 
within the company, which we refered to as type one muda in the Lean introduction of 
CHAPTER 1. 
                                         
28 “Dell Computer Corporation” Harvard Business School, September 25, 1996  
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The tremendous expansion of the industry caused more and more companies to specialize 
in specific manufacturing components.  The competition soon became very intensive and 
for a small start up at the time, the key question was: how do we enter that market? 
Dell’s original strategy was to sell directly to their customers by combining 
manufacturing and distribution channel operations.  The Dell model, as it is today, relies 
on three main principles: selling directly, focusing on customers, and integrating the 
whole value chain.  These three strengths are the core competencies of Dell that we will 
analyze more in detail in the following sections.
2.4 The Direct Business Model 
Dell’s now famous Direct Business Model was radically different from the traditional 
engineering-centric view of the rest of the industry.   
Dell, a small startup in the mid 1980s, could not afford to create every piece of the value 
chain as IBM and HP were doing.  Michael Dell had started as a university freshman to 
assemble computers for midsize companies and did not see the interest in/the benefits of 
entering the same highly competitive market as everybody else was doing.  As he himself 
explains: “in graphic chips, there were about 20 players 10 years ago. In those 
circumstances, do you want to be the 21st player or evaluate the field and pick the best?29” 
Thus initial strategy was to leverage the investments others had made to deliver solutions 
and systems to customers.  A key element of this strategy was o bypass the middleman 
reseller.  For this purpose, sales were primarily generated through advertising in 
computer trade magazines and, eventually in catalogs.
The resulting build-to-order model enabled Dell to start the production cycle that began 
after the company received a customer’s order, and created an efficient customer-pull: 
one of Womack’s 5 Lean principles (see “Lean Thinking” in CHAPTER 1). 
                                         
29 From HBR March-April 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s 
Michael Dell”, p74 
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The benefits of this model were exceptional: by the mid 1990s, Dell’s work-in-process 
(WIP) and finished goods inventory as a percent of total inventory ranged from 10% to 
20%30.  This contrasted sharply with the industry leaders, such as Compaq, Apple and 
IBM, whose WIP and finished goods inventory typically ranged from 50% to 70% of 
total inventory, not including inventory held by their resellers31. 
As a consequence of the initial Direct Business Model strategy, Dell reached a period of 
hyper growth.  The reasons of its extraordinary growth were also its superior flex bility of 
labor and capital assets.  Of course Dell had almost no physical assets but that also meant 
they did not need to move and constantly adapt a 50,000 people organization.  In a fast 
moving industry, it was thus much easier to get more capacity f om the cutting edge 
suppliers.  Growth at 57% a year would certainly have been impossible if Dell had had to 
build its own factories – “I would spend 500% of my time interviewing prospective vice 
presidents because the company would not have 15,000 employees but 80,000.”32 
Dell’s Direct Business Model created an efficient customer-pull syst m and allowed Dell 
to reach an unpreceded rate of growth in the industry.  The two other main strengths of 
Dell are its customer focus and its ability to integrate the value chain. 
2.5 Customer focus 
Customer focus at Dell is threefold and relies on the following principles: u derstanding 
customer needs, keeping close customer contact and managi g tight customer 
segmentation.  As a consequence, Dell masters customer value creation. 
                                         
30 I am thankful to Khusrow Uzair for clarifying this point. Total inventory also includes office supply 
inventory and raw material inventory. Since the rate of obsolescence of WIP and especially of finished 
goods is very high in the PC industry, low WIP and finished goods as a percentage of total i ventory is an 
indicator of Dell’s efficiency. 
31 From HBR August 2000, “Dell’s working capital”, p1 
32 From HBR March-April 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s 
Michael Dell”, p75 
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2.5.1 Understanding customer needs
Understanding customer needs for Dell Corporation means being able to anticipate what 
customers want in order to create the best customer service.  Dell was the first in the 
industry to provide toll free telephone and on-site technical support in an effort to 
differentiate itself in customer service33. 
The Direct Model enabled Dell to have a direct contact to their customers and therefore 
avoid noise in the information they received from them.  Michael Dell explains that the 
feedback system in traditional value chain for automobile distribution can actually lead to 
misinformation34: “If you have three yellow Mustangs sitting on a dealer’s lot and a 
customer wants a red one, the salesman is really good at figuring out how to sell the 
yellow Mustang.  So the yellow Mustang gets sold, and a signal gets sent back to the 
factory that, hey, people want yellow Mustangs.” 
Dell’s extreme ability to understand its customer is a consequence of its efforts to keep 
customer contact as close as possible. 
2.5.2 Close customer contact 
Close customer contact at Dell is done primarily through its Premier Pages and its 
Platinum Councils.   
The Premier Pages are customized intranet sites for over 200 of Dell’s largest global 
customers.  They are located securely within the customers’ firewalls, and they give them 
direct access to purchasing and technical information about the specific configurations 
they buy from Dell.  One of Dell’s customers allows its 50,000 employees to view and 
select products on-line.  They use the Premier Page as an interactive catalog of all the 
configurations the company authorizes; employees can then price and order the PC they 
want.  As a result, Dell’s salespeople are freed to play a more consultative role. 
                                         
33 From HBR August 2000, “Dell’s working capital”, p1 
34 “The dot.com within Ford”, US News & World Report, 7 February 2000, 34 
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The Platinum Councils are regional meetings – in Asia-Pacific, Japan, the United States, 
and Europe – of Dell’s largest customers.  They meet every six to nine months; in the 
larger regions, there is one for the information executives – the CIO types – and then 
there is one for the technical types.  In these meetings, Dell’s senior technologists share 
their views on where the technology is heading and lay out road maps of product plans 
over the next two years.  There are also break out sessions and working groups in which 
Dell’s engineering teams focus on specific product areas and talk about how to solve 
problems that may not necessarily have anything to do with the commercial relationship 
with Dell.  For example, “Is leasing better than buying?” or “How do you manage the 
transition to Windows NT?” or “How do you manage a field force of notebook 
computers?” Another advantage for the customers is the possibility to learn from each 
other since even very different businesses may have very similar problems when it comes 
to PCs. 
As a concrete benefit of this strategy, Michael Dell mentions35: instead of having desktop 
engineers who operate on the theory that customers want performance, Dell concentrated 
on intergenerational product consistency over many years since customers had expressed 
the need for more stability rather than more performance.  “Yeah, performance is okay.  
But what I really want is a stable product that doesn’t change.  Because if I’m trying to 
run a bank or an airline, I don’t care if it’s 2% faster or 3% slower.  What really matters is 
stability”. 
Close customer contact is a key element that enables Dell to pursue a powerful customer 
segmentation strategy. 
                                         
35 Michael Dell reporting customers’ feedback during a Platinum Council. From HBR March-April 1998, 
“The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s Michael Dell” 
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2.5.3 Customer segmentation 
“Computer giant Dell focuses on the process of rapid reorganization (or patching) 
around focused customer segments.  A key How-to rule for this process is that a 
business must be split when its revenue hits $1 billion36.” 
One key aspect of customer segmentation is to recognize that each segment has its own 
issues.  For example, in education,  teacher does not necessarily have a phone in her 
classroom, which makes her difficult to reach.  Dell managers become more and more 
specialized to be able to understand and address each customer’s needs.  Customer 
segmentation enables to forecast capacity and customer’s needs. 
Capacity forecasting is crucial for the direct model.  Getting inventories to turn 30 times 
in year37 would certainly be impossible for any company without sharp forecasts of 
customer needs and expectations.  Sales account managers lead customers through a 
discussion of their future PC purchase.  Dell walks each customer through every 
department of his company, asking him to designate which needs are certain and which 
are contingent.  In case they are contingent on some event, the sal sperson will know 
what that event is so he can follow up.  This is done with Dell’s large accounts, which 
make up the bulk of their business.  For smaller customers, salespeople gather real-time 
information about what customers are buying directly onthe phone.  Moreover, Dell’s 
salespeople can steer customers in real time, on the phone, towards configurations that 
are available, which is another way Dell can fine-tune th  balance between supply and 
demand38. 
As we mentioned earlier, Dell organized councils yearly with their large account 
customers.  These councils, with direct customer feedback, enable Dell to better 
                                         
36 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt and Donald N. Sull, “Strategy as Simple Rules”, HBR 
37 From HBR March-April 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s 
Michael Dell” 
38 and in that case, a customer won’t necessarily obtain the exact computer she had in mind, but will still 
pay for the Dell service premium… 
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understand its customers.  For example they made possible the early adoption of 
Pentium-based systems – “Dell beat the competition to themark t place with Pentium-
based products and was the first in the industry to achieve volume production of systems 
with the 120mhz Pentium processor”39.  Also in July 1995, Dell became the first 
manufacturer to convert its entire major product line to the Pentium echnology40. 
“We sometimes know more about a customer’s operations than they do 
themselves41” 
Ironically, Dell’s original strategy was to make no customer differentiation at all and treat 
all customers equally.  This evolved towards a very elaboratd customer segmentation 
strategy (Figure 3).  
Figure 3: Dell’s Fast-cycle Segmentation42 
                                         
39 Anon, “Dell First to Ship Systems with the New Pentium Processor”, PR N w wire, April 19, 1995 
40 Anon, “Dell Taking Orders for Factory-Installed Windows’95 on Dell Dimension Desktop PCs”, PR 
Newswire, August 2, 1995. 
41 Michael Dell explaining how direct sells enables Dell to keep track of a customer’s total PC purchases, 
country by country, From HBR March-Ap il 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with 
Dell Computer’s Michael Dell”, p79 
42 From HBR March-April 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s 
Michael Dell”, p78 
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In 1998, 90% of Dell’s sales went to institutions (business or government) and 70% to 
very large customers that bought at least $1 million in PCs per year43. 
An interesting consequence of Dell’s customer focus is its ability to deliver value to its 
customers. 
2.5.4 Four examples of customer value creation 
The following four examples illustrate Dell’s customer value cr ation. 
1st example:  Eastman Chemical has its own unique mix of software, some of it licensed 
from Microsoft, some of it they have written themselves, some of it having to do with the 
way their network works.  Normally they would get their PCs, take them out of the box, 
and then somebody carrying a walkie-talkie and diskettes and CD-ROMs would come to 
each employee’s desk to set up the system and load the appropriate software.  Typically, 
this would require one to two hours and cost $200 to $300.  Dell’s solution was to create 
a massive network in their factory with high-speed, 100-megabit Ethernet.  They load 
Eastman Chemical’s software onto a huge Dell server.  Then when a machine comes 
down the assembly line and says: “I’m an Eastman Chemical analyst workstation, 
configuration number 14”, all of a sudden a few hundred megabytes of data come rushing 
through the network and onto the workstation’s hard disk, just as part of the progressive 
build through Dell’s factory.  If the customer wants, Dell can put an asset tag with the 
company’s logo on the machine, and they can keep an electronic register of the 
customer’s assets.  This solution is much simpler for the customer than sending 
somebody around on a thankless mission, placing asset tags on computer when he finds 
them. 
                                         
43 From HBR March-April 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s 
Michael Dell”, p77 
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What happens to the money Dell’s customer is saving? Dell could charge them $250, 
arguing that its customer still saves $50.  But instead they charge $15 or $20, and make 
their product and service much more valuable. 
“It also means we’re not going to be just your PC vendor anymore.  We’re going 
to be your IT department44.” 
2nd example: Boeing has 100,000 Dell PCs, and Dell has 30 people that live at Boeing.  
Boeing account at Dell Corporation is large enough to justify a dedicated on-site team 
from Dell. 
“If you look at the things we are doing for them or for other customers, we don’t 
look like a supplier, we look more like Boeing’s PC department.  We become 
intimately involved in planning their PC needs and the configuration of their 
network44.” 
At the Boeing Corporation, Dell almost plays the role of its own customer. 
3rd example: Dell, for many of its customers, is the most efficient way to buy Intel of 
Microsoft technologies.  But beyond that Dell is evolving into a technology selector, or 
navigator by helping customers to choose relevant technologies.  “Intel and Microsoft 
tend to launch into a massive variety of things, some of which are speculative and aimed 
at exploring new technologies.  We think it is our job to help our customers sort out the 
technology relevant to today’s needs from the bleeding edge45.” 
4th example: the R&D department at Dell (1,500 people in 1998) works on 2 main 
domains: a) improving the whole user experience, that is selecting appropriate 
technology, delivering the latest relevant technology, making it easy to use and keeping 
costs down and b) focusing on process and quality improvements in manufacturing45.
                                         
44From HBR March-April 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s 
Michael Dell” p79 
45 From HBR March-April 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s 
Michael Dell” p82 
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In conclusion, what Dell is really doing is an intensive use of technology to free people 
up to solve more complicated problems. 
“Remember, a lot of companies have far more complex problems to deal with 
than PC purchasing and servicing.  They can’t wait to get somebody else to take 
care of that so they can worry about more strategic issues46.” 
The third main strength of the Dell model is its value chain integration process. 
2.6 Value chain integration – “virtual integration” 
“We are not experts in the technology we buy; we are experts in the technology of 
integration.” 
Dick Hunter, Director, Dell Corporation’s supply-chain management 
What exactly does value chain integration mean?  We could define it as: A process of 
collaboration between all the stakeholders of an enterprise that optimizes both internal 
and external activities involved in delivering value to the end customer47.  Val e chain 
integration at Dell Corporation is the combination of two principles: disdain of inventory 
and supplier partnerships. 
“With vertical integration, you can be an efficient producer as long as the world isn’t 
changing very much.  But virtual integration (see  
Figure 4) lets you be efficient and responsive to change at the same time – at least that is 
what we are trying to do.48” 
                                         
46 From HBR March-April 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s 
Michael Dell” p80 
47 Adapted from John Dobbs of Cambridge Technology Partners, a leading systems integrator, quoted in 
the Economist’s June 1999 survey on “Busi ess and the Internet”. 
48 From HBR March-April 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s 
Michael Dell”, p83 
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Figure 4: The evolution of a Faster Business Model49 
2.6.1 Disdain inventory 
“[Inventory is]… the physical embodiment of bad information.” 
Paul Bell, Director, Dell Computer Corporation50 
Dell’s metrics for inventory is what they call inventory velocity.  It basically changes the 
focus from “how much inventory there is” to “how fast is the inventory moving”.  A 
concrete result is that Dell has 11 days of inventory against 80 for its competitors51.  Thus 
when Intel comes out with a new processor, Dell is 69 days in advance on the market.  
Once again, Dell provides a clear illustration of customer-pull as it is defined by in the 
Lean enterprise. 
                                         
49 From HBR March-April 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s 
Michael Dell”, p82 
50 In 2000, Paul Bell was running Dell Computer’s operations in Europe, the Middle East and Africa 
51 From HBR March-April 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s 
Michael Dell”, p76 
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For example, monitors from Sony do not get out of their boxes before they reach the 
customer.  Dell considers that extra testing would be a loss of time and resources since 
Sony monitors have under 1000 defects per million51. 
In order to keep a close eye to inventory velocity, inventory levels and replenishment 
needs are communicated regularly (hourly with some vendors), which is simple since 
Dell has only three centers worldwide: Austin, Ireland and Malaysia.  Besides, demand 
forecasts are precise because of a large customer mix: no customer represents more than 
1-2% of Dell’s revenues51 and their needs are not correlated.  A huge benefit of this 
regular information update is that it avoids the bullwhip effect52. 
Dell’s focus on inventory velocity is a way to minimize asset risks.  Assets are comprised 
of inventory and accounts receivable.  Since most of Dell’s customers are large 
companies, accounts receivable typically do not bear much risk.  Accounts receivable 
from Goldman Sachs or Microsoft for example are seldom a source of concern.  
Inventory value however can drop dramatically and very fast.  The PC industry has a very 
short product lifetime, and in turn inventories lose value rapidly.  For example, in the 
mid-1990s, Dell maintained an inventory of components.  The cost of components, such 
as processor chips, comprised about 80% of the costs of a PC53.  As new technology 
replaced old, the prices of components fell by an average of 30% a year54. 
Another advantage of keeping low finished-goods inventory is that is made it 
unnecessary to dismantle PCs to replace the microprocessor when Intel Corporation 
discovered its Pentium chip was flawed in 1994.  Dell was able to quickly manufacture 
systems with the “updated” Pentium chip while others (i.e. Compaq) were still selling 
                                         
52The expression “bullwhip effect” illus rates that the longer the time lag between the point of demand and 
the point of supply, the more variability, the more inventory, the higher costs and the more risks there is in 
the chain 
53 From HBR August 2000, “Dell’s working capital”, p2 
54 From The Economist: “ Selling PCs like bananas”, October 5 1996, p63 
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flawed systems from inventory55.  In July 1995, Dell became the first manufacturer to 
convert its entire major product line to the Pentium Technology39. 
Similarly, Dell was able to begin shipping its Dell Dimension systems equipped with 
Microsoft Corporation’s new Windows 95 operation system on August 25, 1995 – the 
very day Microsoft launched the product.  As a direct marketer, Dell was able to bring 
new component technology to the market with an average of 35 days – a third of the time 
it took competitors to move a new product through indirect channels56. 
An impressive result of Dell’s focus on inventory velocity is their negative cash 
conversion cycle57, which basically means that they get paid by their customers before 
they pay their suppliers58. 
But Dell’s successful value chain integration is not only a consequence of its tight 
inventory management.  Its partnerships with key suppliers are the other key to its 
success. 
2.6.2 Supplier partnerships 
“I’m only half joking when I say that the only thing better than the Internet would 
be mental telepathy.59” 
Michael Dell, Harvard Business Review. 
                                         
55 From HBR August 2000, “Dell’s working capital”, p4 
56 Judy, Hard, “Runaway Horse: Michael Dell wants to rein in growth; shareholders want whip”, Financial 
World, October 24, 1995, p.36. 
57 Cash Conversion Cycle = Days Sales of Inventory (DSI) + Days Sales Outstanding  (DSO)– Days 
Payables Outstanding (DPO) 
DSI = Net Inventory / (Quarterly Cost of Goods Sold / 90)
DSO = Net Accounts Receivables / (Quarterly Sales / 90) 
DPO = Accounts Payables / (Quarterly Cost of Goods Sold / 90) 
58 Kevin Rollins, vice chairman of Dell Computer Corporation, “Using Information to Speed Execution”, 
HBR March-April 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s Michael 
Dell”, p81 
59 From HBR March-April 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s 
Michael Dell”, p83 
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Modern information technology enables Dell to share design databases and 
methodologies with supplier-partners.  As a consequence, time to market is dramatically 
diminished and the resulting value is shared between buyers and suppliers.  Quality 
measures are set with service providers to enable real time evaluation and total 
transparence in the whole supply chain.  For example, everybody can see immediately 
when parts are dispatched, how long it takes to respond to a request for service. 
Suppliers’engineers are assigned to Dell’s design team and Dell treats them as if they 
were part of the company.  When a new product is launched, suppliers’engineers are 
stationed right in Dell’s plants.  If a customer calls with a problem, Dell then stops 
shipping products while they fix the problem in real time. 
Figuring out how many partners are needed is a process of trial and error following the 
rule that fewer suppliers is better.  Having only a few partners enables Dell to inform 
them precisely about components’ defects so they can redesign the components.  The 
whole process eliminates poor quality and therefore friction in the system.  “Clearly we 
could not operate that way if we were dealing with hundreds of suppliers.  So for us, 
working with a handful of partners is one of the keys to improving quality – and therefore 
speed – in our system60.” 
It is important to note that the whole work of supplier coordination is taken very 
seriously.  At Dell Corporation, the R&D department spends a substantial part of its time 
on optimizing process coordination. 
Dell recognizes that all partnerships are not to be treated equally.  The length of supplier 
relationships highly depends on the stability of the underlying technology.  Monitors, for 
example, are a fairly stable technology.  Memory chip technologies, on the contrary, are 
                                         
60 Kevin Rollins, vice chairman of Dell Computer Corporation, “Using Information to Speed Execution”, 
HBR March-April 1998, “The Power of Virtual Integration: An Interview with Dell Computer’s Michael 
Dell”, p81 
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evolving fast, which makes Dell much less willing to commit to a long-term partnership 
with memory chip manufacturers. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Modern information technology is clearly a key enabler of Dell’s business model.  
However its direct business model was Dell’s initial strategy rather than a consequence of 
Internet technologies.  In fact, Dell’s business model exhibits clear lean characteristics 
such as customer pull, product flow and muda elimination.  One question remains 
unanswered: would Dell’s direct business model still have succeeded without the IT 
revolution? 
3 Case Study #2: eBay, Inc. 
“eBay is in a position to give back to America what Wal-Mart took away – the 
notion of the Main Street Merchant.  Mom and Pop running their little shop, doing 
business with other people and making a living atit, and feeling good at it.” 
Bob Kagle, Benchmark Capital 
3.1 Today’s big picture 
Today eBay is the world largest and most popular person-to-person community on the 
Internet61.  It has furnished the world with a forum for the sale of nearly 4,500 categories 
of merchandise.  Its some 16 million registered users can buy and sell goods ranging from 
Beanie Babies to antiques from the comfort of their Web browsers.  In a bid to foster a 
sense of cyber-community, eBay has added features such as chat rooms and bulletin 
boards to its Web site.  It also has launched more than 50 smaller, location specific 
marketplaces around the US so users can purchase large items more easily.  In addition, 
                                         
61Harvard Business School, September 28, 1999, eBay, Inc. p.1 
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the company launched a business-to-bu iness service, eBay Business Exchange that 
auctions more than 60,000 goods (personal computers, industrial goods) to small 
businesses.  eBay elevated its prestige factor through the acquisition of old-guard auction 
house Butterfields.  The company generates revenue through listing and selling fees, s 
well as through advertising on its Web site (in partnership with AOL Time Warner). 
3.2 Overview/History62 
Given eBay’s success, it is hard to believe that the company evolved out of a pet project.  
It all started with a conversation between 31-year-old founder, Pierre Omidyar63, and his 
(now) wife about her collection of Pez dispensers.  Frustrated that she could not readily 
find other people with Pez dispensers to trade, she wished that there were a way to 
connect with others over the Internet.  A Web enthusiast i  is free time, Omidyar 
developed a program that would allow his wife and other collectors to trade items over 
the newly emerging Internet.  His Web site, called Auction Web, was launched in 
September 1995, and held its first auction on Labor Day.  Making a name for itself 
largely through word of mouth, the company incorporated in 1996, the same year it began 
to charge a fee to auction items online.  It also enhanced its service with Feedback Forum 
(buyer and seller ratings) that year. 
The company changed the name to eBay in 1997 and began promoting itself through 
advertising.  By the middle of that year, eBay was boasting nearly 800,000 auctions each 
day and Benchmark Capital came on board as a significant financial backer. 
Margaret Whitman, a former Hasbro executive, replaced Omidyar as CEO in early 1998.  
eBay made a blockbuster debut as a public company later that year.  The company moved 
closer to household name status in 1998 by launching a national ad campaign and inking 
alliance deals with America Online (now AOL Time Warner) and WebTV.   
                                         
62 All figures from Hoover's Inc, Dow Jones Interactive 
63 Omidyar was a services development engineer at General Magic, a mobile communication platform 
company, when he created Auction Web. Source: HBR, September 1999, eBay, Inc. 
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eBay showed its acquisitive streak in 1999 with purchases of Alando (online auctions in 
Germany) and Billpoint (person-to-person credit card technology).  It also made one of 
its first investments in an outside company with the purchase of 6% of TradeOut.com, an 
online seller of corporate surplus materials.  The company set the jewel in its 1999 
acquisition crown when it acquired upscale auction house Butterfield & Butterfield (now 
just Butterfields).  eBay also expanded through a joint venture with Australia-based ecorp 
(formerly PBL Online).  A bit of the bloom came off the rose in 1999 when online 
service interruptions (one "brownout" in June persisted for 22 hours) revealed a chink in 
eBay's armor.  The company called its top 10,000 users to convey its apologies and 
pledged to improve its Web site's performance. 
In 2000 eBay agreed to develop person-to-person and merchant-to-person auction sites 
for Disney's GO Network, announced plans to distribute information thr ugh wireless 
products, and joined with banking giant Wells Fargo to offer eBay sellers the option of 
accepting online checks.  Also that year the US Department of Justice began an 
investigation to determine if eBay has violated antitrust laws in its dealing with 
competitors.  In other legal news, a class-action lawsuit was filed against the company 
claiming that eBay is an auctioneer and therefore must authenticate the items on its site.  
(The case was dismissed by a trial court in early 2001; plaintiffs have said they will 
appeal.)  
Also in 2000 the company expanded into Japan through 70%-owned eBay Japan 
(computer firm NEC owns the rest) and launched Canadian and Austrian sites.  In 
addition, eBay took an equity stake in Online used-car dealer AutoTrader.com and 
launched a co-branded used-car auction Web site.  It also acquired Half.com, an online 
trading community with 250,000 registered users. 
3.3 EBay’s business model 
Since the online consumer auction market drew from a number of different offline 
trading formats, including auctions, collectable shows, flea markets, garage sales and 
classified adds, it is difficult to accurately size eBay’s market.  Nor is it easier to evaluate 
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Ebay’s share of this market.  In an April 1999 report, Salomon Smith Barneyestimated 
eBay would control 75% to 80% of the estimated year 2000 $3.7 billion virtual person-
to-person auction market64. 
Unlike many other e-commerce companies, eBay does not rely on advertising to generate 
revenues.  eBay generates revenues in two ways.  First, li ting and special placement 
fees, the fees sellers paid for listing their items, account for about 45% of eBay’s 
revenues.  Second, final value fees, a percentage of final sale price of item65, accounts for 
about 55% of revenues. 
The strength of eBay’s business model relies on three characteristics: its new value 
creation proposition (management and regulation of the mechanisms for setting prices 
and allocating goods), the social aspect of the eBay community, and its trust 
environment. 
3.4 New value creation: creating liquidity 
“The transaction is the means to the price rather than the price a means to the 
transaction66.” 
Charles Smith, author of Auctions: The Social Construction of Value 
Liquidity is generally defined as the ease of converting assets into c h.  eBay achieves 
liquidity by matching buyers and sellers and facilitating price discovery, whereby buyers 
and sellers cooperate and compete to arrive at a mutually acceptable deal. 
Tapscott, author of Digital Capital, compares eBay’s business model to ancient Greece 
Agoras67.  Agoras, whether classified ads or spot markets, historically served a special 
                                         
64 Richard Zandi and Mark J. Rowen ‘Equity Research: United States Electronic Commerce: eBay, Inc.” 
SalomonSmithBarney (April 7, 1999): 18. 
65 Harvard Business School, September 28, 1999, eBay, Inc., p.5 
66 Charles Smith, interview by Alan Mayer, Alliance for Converging Technologies, December 1998.
67 Don Tapscott, Digital Capital: harnessing the power of business webs, Harvard Business School Press, 
2000, 40 
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distribution function for goods of uncertain or volatile value: unique, distressed or 
perishable items and commodities for which supply and demand fluctuate continually.  
These goods are unsuited to traditional fixed-price model (there is no list price); their 
value makes it cost effective to sell low- nd items that would not be worth a $25 
classified newspaper ad.  “You are lowering the cost of transactions, so more transactions 
will happen.68” 
Besides the liquidity creation, eBay offers other sources of utility for customers among 
which are: convenience, low distribution and marketing costs, lots of information about 
all aspects of the deal, and entertainm nt – the thrill of the chase, “Many eBay 
participants simply write off their purchases as the cost of an evening’s entertainment69”. 
The second strength of eBay and on which depends any agora is the social and 
community life that thrives on eBay online. 
3.5 Social/community aspect 
Ebay’s community life is THE key element to insure what marketing strategists call 
stickiness, the intangible incentive that keeps customers coming back again and again to a 
given company’s services.  eBay appears to be more that just a finely automated auction 
service.  In addition to providing a venue for selling items, eBay provides buyers and 
sellers a place to socialize, to discuss topic of common interest, and to provide feedback 
to one another.  All these features were designed to foster a large and growing commerce-
oriented online community.  In December 1998, eBay ranked second to Yahoo! in total 
monthly usage hours, according to Media Metrix and its audience reach had increased 
200% between April 1998 and February 1999. 
 
                                         
68 Penelope Patsuris, “One-to-one auctions, “The Forbes Digital Tool (January 16, 1998): 
http://www.forbes.com/tool/html/98/jan/0116/side1.htm 
69 Don Tapscott, Digital Capital: harnessing the power of business webs, Harvard Business School Press, 
2000, 42 
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EBay users are as vital to the company’s success as its business model.  Referring to 
themselves as “eBay people”, eBay users embrace the site as their own, creating a 24-
hour a day collector community online.  It is that community that eBay strived to 
cultivate. 
“From the start, eBay’s business has been based on the strength of our 
community.  Over time, interpersonal relationships have developed and those 
relationships make people loyal to one another.  It’s similar to the growth of a 
little town.70” 
Jeffrey S. Skoll, VP Strategic Planning and Analysis, eBay Inc.
Community is often merely a new kind of marketing tool, a sticky device to capture 
customer attention.  However, in eBay community is a central functional design element.  
The participants have implicitly agreed to engage in a self-organizing group process to 
discover the price and allocation of goods, that is the “social construction of value.71”A 
service like eBay requires voluntary and collective participation, which makes it much 
more challenging a business to construct than traditional retail. 
Mary Meeker, an analyst with Morgan Stanley Sean Witter, believes that high switching 
costs and community values played an important role in eBay’s successful community.  
After using eBay for just a short time, users become actively involved in e-mail 
dialogues; their reputations on the systems are built as other users observe their actions 
and rate their reliability; and users come to know the ins and outs of the system.  Because 
of this, Meeker feels that once someone becomes an eBay user, there are not many 
reasons to go elsewhere72. 
                                         
70John M. Moran, “The bids are in growing numbers of Internet users drawn to online auctions”, The 
Hartford Courant (January 22, 1998): F1 
71 Charles Smith, Auctions: The Social Construction of Value (Berkeley: University of California press, 
1990) 
72 Mary Meeker, “eBay (EBAY): Initiating coverage of EBAY with outperform”, M gan Stanley Dean 
Witter Report (September 24, 1998) 
The E-World as an Enabler to Lean 
 
49 
Stories about eBay users helping one another prevail.  One of the most famous is 
certainly that about the disappearance of this woman who provided information about 
dolls (e.g. where to find a missing shoe, who to speak about a type of doll).  Those in the 
doll community who had come to know and value this woman became quite worried.  
When they tracked her down they learned that she had gone through a divorce, her 
husband had the computer, and she did not have the money to buy a new one.  Because 
the doll community missed her and wanted her back online, a group of them pooled 
together to purchase a computer for her. 
3.6 Trust and Safety - Security (antifraud) policies 
As Meeker notes, the eBay community is self-policing, and users frequently form 
“neighborhood watch” groups to help guard against misuse or violations of site etiquette.  
However self-regulation processes soon became a major concern for eBay’s top 
managers. 
“Depending on what the environment is, different things become important.  In 
December, I would not have been able to tell you that trust and safety was going 
to be what we did in January, February, and March.” 
Meg Whitman, President and CEO, eBay 
In the early days of eBay, the mentality was to let the online auction regulate itself.  
There was therefore no control of exchanged content.  However as the company became 
well known, the press started to challenge them about sensitive and sometimes illegal 
items on their site (e.g. kidneys, assault weapons, drugs, Nazi memorabilia).  At first 
eBay managers neglected the press.  They had never proactively screened the site; if 
people identified illegal items, they would just take them down, but never did they 
proactively go out to do it themselves.  Then the video game community entered the 
debate and with the IDSA (Interactive Digital Software Association, one of the most 
vigilant protectors of human intellectual property rights), they argued they should adopt a 
more proactive stance and threatened to sue the company.  This issue had never been a 
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number one priority and initially eBay managers were confident that they were protected 
by the Digital Millenium Copyright Act.  True but the issue was elsewhere.  eBay 
managers rapidly understood that rumors were threatening the core value of their 
business (the character of the company): trust among eBay users.  They reacted by being 
very vigilant and proactive, helping public authorities protect intellectual rights.  They 
told the ISDA they were going to help them screen and developed technology tools to do 
automatic keyword searches that allowed them to identify auctions before they entered 
their site73.  
Trust (of other participants) and authentication (getting what you expect) are big issues in
any Agora.  Newspaper classifieds are risky form beginning to end: the publisher takes 
no responsibility for the authenticity or quality of the goods or the trustworthiness of the 
parties to the transaction.  Meanwhile, high-end auction houses like Christie’s and top 
financial markets like the New York Stock Exchange assure trust and authenticity and 
vouchsafe the completion of transactions.  But even these markets deny accountability for 
the true value of a good. 
eBay’s solution to the trust poblem is the Feedback Forum.  Buyers and sellers can rate 
each other by writing one-line reviews of one another’s performance.  Some regulars 
have accumulated thousands of positive comments.  Through this grassroots mechanism, 
these isolated individual and small businesses have built enduring global brands in 
cyberspace.  Instance of fraud do occur, but eBay provides a small financial warranty, 
and fee-based escrow service, and authentication services for high-end product 
categories. 
The Feedback Forum, already the largest public repository of customer opinion in the 
world, is eBay’s core human capital asset.  If a lack of trust can definitely ruin a 
company’s business, eBay’s example shows how to turn trust into a powerful strategic 
advantage. 
                                         
73 250,000 new items were posted daily. HBR eBay case, 7 
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3.7 Conclusion 
eBay’s business model exhibits three main characteristics.  First, it illustrates the 
potential of utilizing Internet technologies to create new value to customers.  Skeptics 
might object that eBay has simply created a new market based on another channel.  We 
prefer to argue that Pierre Omidyar used his knowledge to create value that automatically 
found its buyers.  Second the eBay model shows the power of community effects.  eBay 
successfully weathered the storms of new entrants in its market thanks to its strong 
community of users.  Finally eBay illustrates the importance of trust on a virtual 
environment where users converse and often collaborate.
4 Case Study #3: The Linux Phenomenon 
“The [open-source] world behaves in many respects like a free market or an 
ecology, a collection of selfish agents attempting to maximize utility which in the 
process produces a self-correcting spontaneous order more elaborate and efficient 
that any amount of central planning could have achieved. 
Given a large enough beta-tes er and co-developer base, almost every problem 
will be characterized quickly and the fix obvious to someone.” 
Eric Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar 
4.1 History of the Linux phenomenon 
Early in 1991, a twenty-two-year-old Finnish university student named Linus Torvalds 
confronted a dilemma.  He wanted but could not afford market versions of Unix, a 
powerful and flexible operating system costing $5,000 for the software and another 
$10,000 for a specialized workstation.  As a result, he decided to build a Unix clone for a 
PC and designed a simple kernel (the core of the operating system). 
On October 2, 1991, Torvalds posted the first working version – Linux .02 – on Usenet, 
the Internet’s global information-shari g resource at the time.  He dared others to try his 
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program that he later patented under the Free Software Foundation’s general public 
license.  The license made Linux free and available to all and required anyone who 
passed it along to include the source code. 
An initial hundred or so programmers seized on the idea, each testing the code, 
commenting back, and proposing changes.  Tovalds incorporated what worked and usage 
mushroomed. By 2000, Linux, complex to set up and manage but free for the asking, 
powered an estimated 20million servers around the word.  Micros ft acknowledged it as 
a challenge to Windows.  A stable, reliable, highly functional product, Linux powered 
Web sites, email services, and useful real-world pplications.  Top technology companies 
like Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Intel and IBM lined up to endorse it.  Stock prices of Linux 
software companies like Red Hat, Corel, and Cobalt Networks took off.  The product had 
shifted from a hacker’s dream to commercially viable technology, with lots of money to 
be made. 
The dream of Linus Torvalds was cle rly made possible by the Internet, thanks to which 
network effects could effectively take off.  The purpose of this case study is to illustrate 
how the Internet can foster environments where contributors work towards a common 
goal using creative collaboration.  First it examines the new design paradigm exhibited by 
the Linux phenomenon and second it shows how other companies have already started to 
successfully imitate the same model. 
4.2 A new design paradigm: the 3 design principles of the Linux 
phenomenon 
The Linux phenomenon is really intriguing and its mechanisms are highly debated.  How 
does such a loose collection of well-meaning souls manage to achieve coherent results?  
As Tapscott argues, “designers, whether of physical goods (e.g. cars, toothbrushes), 
technology (computer software), or abstraction (e.g. business strategy), tend to have a 
linear view of the design process.  Define your needs, do a high-level desi n, and then do 
a detailed one.  Create a prototype, then the item.  Test before deploying on a large scale.  
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And […] keep the team as small and as focused as you can, because there is a law of 
diminishing returns in design teams.  Software engineers have for nearly thirty years 
sworn by Brooks’s law which states that as the number of program develope s increases, 
the number of bugs increases exponentially.  Beyond the minimum number required to 
get the job done, adding people produces a result that is late, of inferior quality, and over 
budget.” 
What was different in the Linux phenomenon then? Eric Raymond gives three design 
processes principles as an explanation74. 1) Treating your users as co-developers is the 
least-hassled route to rapid code improvement and effective debugging. 2) Release early. 
Release often. And listen to your customers. 3) Given enough testers and co-designers, 
almost every problem will be identified quickly; the fix will become obvious to someone. 
4.3 Companies building on the bazaar model75 
4.3.1 Software development 
For-profit companies have recognized the power of the Net-enabld bazaar model and, in 
1998, began to adopt it.  Sun opened its Java offering to customer innovation, and 
Netscape published the source code to its browser. 
Similarly, Wintel (Windows/Intel) generates real cash in exchange for tangible value, 
namely: Windows-Compatible Solution.  The participants create collections of modular 
goods, which match needful users to an integrated outcome.  Each participant is an 
autonomous producer (Cisco/Dell/GM…) and the producers adhere to common standards 
to ensure compatibili y and connectivity. 
Arguably, software development is a special case, what Tapscott calls a “gift economy” 
in which producers improve their tools as they use them.  They fix bugs because they 
                                         
74 Eric Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar”, vailable on the Web at: 
http://www.tuxedo.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-baz ar/ 
75 Tapscott, Digital Capital – Harnessing the Power of Business Webs, 129-138 
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need to use the software personally.  As will be discussed in CHAPTER 5, the 
mechanisms of the Linux phenomenon are still very controversial. 
4.3.2 Automobile design 
General Motors collaborates with its electronic marketplace to design cars using three-
dimensional visual prototypes that it distributes via the web.  Participants include style-
conscious customers, fleet buyers, knowledgeable service technicians, supply-chain 
partners, dealers, car buffs, and industrial designers.  These participants are motivated to 
provide the “gift” of their advice because they love cars, enjoy interacting with the b-web 
community, and gain pleasure from influencing the design of a future car.  When General 
Motors adopts an idea, it publicizes the news to the community, enhancing the reputation 
of the contributor.  The manufacturer returns the favor by providing buyers rebates based 
on the quality and quantity of contributions. 
4.3.3 Online help services 
Amazon.com uses collaborative filtering to help customers choose books.  Its software 
creates anonymous “recommendation” communities of readers and music fans who share 
similar interests.  It produces a reading list just for you, choosing purchases by other 
customers who bought the same books as you did  
Similarly, Cisco’s engineers monitor and contribute to various online technical support 
forums in which its customers provide one another with tips and advice.  This is in 
addition to the large volume of online documentation that the company provides on its 
own Web site.  Cisco’s help desk increases customer engagement and loyalty while 
reducing its costs: the company estimates that its online support environment enables it to 
avoid hiring four hundred engineers each year. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The Linux phenomenon exhibits very singular properties.  Its profound mechanisms are 
unclear but Raymond’s three design process principles are very compelling.  In addition, 
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evidence of for-p ofit companies building on the same model demonstrates the potential 
of the phenomenon and emphasizes the need for today’s managers to learn how to 
leverage network effects and to know when to sacrifice some control over product 
evolution for the extra momentum that other contributors can provide. 
5 Case Study #4: Enron Corporation 
5.1 Overview76 
Houston-based Enron is doing an end run around its energy rivals, transforming itself 
from a gas pipeline company into a global energy and telecommunications powerhouse. 
Enron, the US's largest buyer and seller of natural gas, operates a 32,000-mile gas 
pipeline system that spans 21 states. 
Also the top wholesale power marketer in the US, Enron markets and trades not only 
electricity and natural gas, but a wide range of commodities: coal, chemicals, paper, 
fiber-optic bandwidth - even energy emission allowances. The company provides risk 
management services, energy project financing, energy consulting, and engineering and 
construction services for energy infrastructure around the world. It also owns interests in 
merchant power plants and other energy projects in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, Europe, 
India, the Middle East, and South America. Enron's generation facilities have a combined 
capacity of some 14,350 MW. 
The company has agreed to sell its Portland General Electric (PGE) utility to Sierra 
Pacific Resources, but the energy crisis in the western US has hurt Sierr  Pacific and 
threatened to kill the deal. Enron plans to compete in deregulated retail electricity 
markets nationwide through its stake in The New Power Company (TNPC). 
                                         
76From Hoover’s Inc. prodided by Dow Jones Interactive 
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Outside the energy industry, the company's Enron Broadband Services communications 
arm is building a national fiber-optic, Internet protocol-based network, and it operates a 
market for the trading of communications bandwidth. Enron's purchase of the UK's 
Wessex Water (now part of Azurix) has moved the company into the international water 
market. 
The Enron model exhibits three main characteristics: 1) creating value based on industry 
standards, 2) building on the stock exchange model and 3) focusing on one’s core 
competency. 
5.2 Creating value based on industry standards / network 
infrastructures 
Networked infrastructures (telecommunication networks, roads and trucks, money 
markets) lie in the heart of the entire economy.
Creating value based networked infrastructures enables companies to benefit from 
powerful network effects. 
“[…] if the value of a network to a single user is $1 for each other user on the 
network, then a network of size 10 has a total value of roughly $100.  In contrast, 
a network size of 100 has a total value of roughly $10,000.  A tenfold increase in 
the size of the network leads to a hundred-fold increase in its value.77” 
For example, as railways spread across the United States in the nineteenth century, 
touching ever more towns and cities, their value increased exponentially, enabling new 
“network” business models like the Sears retail catalog. 
Likewise, Enron used the network of energy distributors to develop its business: selling 
power. 
                                         
77 Shapiro and Varian, “Information Rules”, 184 
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5.3 Building on the stock exchange model 
There are several reasons to be willing to organize a market as an exchange.  Thinking 
about financial markets can help understand the characteristics of an exchange.  First, 
money has very specific properties (besides the traditional 3: unit of account, store of 
value and medium of exchange):  1) It is pure information.  2) Unlike information (email 
messages) it is a pure commodity.  3) It can gain value from itself without diminishing its 
worth to the depositor.  These properties of money explain why financial intermediaries 
capture extraordinary benefits from their privileged roles.  An exchange has the following 
advantages: 1) Reduced search costs, 2) Reduced transactions costs, 3) Negotiation of 
short-term and long-term contracts (Spot and Forward markets, hedging and risk 
management), 4) Efficient aggregation of supply and demand, 5) Efficiency in billing, 6) 
Stable rating and pricing policies, and 7) Contract enforcement. 
All these reasons help us to understand why companies like Enron try and apply this 
model to their industry (which of course requires a commodity product). 
5.4 Focusing on one’s core competency 
The new environment of deregulation, price volatility and customer dissatisfaction 
challenges many power companies.  Deregulation smashes the assumption behind the 
asset-based mind-set, disaggregating the businesses of generation, transmission, and 
marketing, each potentially a distinct business with unique management needs. 
Enron Corporation was first to believe that the power industry will be sliced, diced and 
globalized and therefore chose to concentrate on its core competency: selling energy.  
Though it builds physical assets, Enron readily sacrifices its power plants, gas wells and 
pipelines to support its global strategy.  In 1999, the company spun out its Enron Oil and 
Gas (EOG) subsidiary as an independent business, saying that in the deregulated North 
American market, such fixed assets were no longer strategic.  The parent company, with 
a focus on resale, distribution, and customer service, would get better commodity prices 
in the open marketplace than from a captive internal subsidiary 
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Enron’s growth engine and 89 percent of its 1998 revenues of $31billion derive from 
wholesale energy sales, which make it North America’s largest supplier of electricity and 
natural gas. 
Enron sells power from anyone to anyone, via a competitor’s network or via its wn, 
drawing on the structural capital of the entire industry.  Its trading staff uses 
sophisticated, computer-based risk-management analytics, combined with networked 
market applications and trading and delivery systems that encompass thousands of 
suppliers, channels, and end-customers. 
In addition, Enron has several new ventures building on the exchange model: a telecom 
bandwidth exchange, a weather future exchange and a national Internet fiber-optic 
network for multimedia.  All reflect the company’s risk management core competency.  
The fiber-optic network, an initiative of Enron Communications, transmits TV-quality 
videoconferences.  Again, however, Enron is less concerned about owning the end-t -e d 
asset that about delivering the customer service.  As Enron Communications CEO Joe 
Hirko mentions: 
“In the telecommunications industry, companies say they can only give you 
quality of service because they own the network end-to-end.  It’s an asset-focused 
view.  We’re going to link our networks together at a software layer so that we 
can deliver the same quality of service end-to- nd.  But we will do it over 
multiple networks, invisible to the content provider.”
Enron has also started an energy management outsourcing business, positioning itself as a 
value-added infrastructure services provider.  For most businesses – even some 
manufacturers whose energy costs can be 15percent or more of total expenses – p wer 
management is an afterthought.  Enron views customer-owned on-site assets like boilers, 
chilers, lighting, and controls as totally unregulated private utilities.  It estimates the 
value of this market to be $240billion in the US alone.  Enron wants to outsource the 
entire energy management function, including asset capitalization and risk management, 
on long-term, pay-for-performance contracts. 
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5.5 FedEx’s example 
FedEx is another company using an infrastructure network (of roads and trucks) that 
worked on identifying its core competency.  As a matter of fact, not only was FedEx a 
pioneer with an intelligent software-enabled air-t uck network, but then in late 1998, it 
declared that its physical distribution system of trucks and airplanes was less valuable 
that its internetworked information resources. FedEx decided to focus on value-added 
context services like online package tracking and logistics outsourcing, and leave the 
“driving” to other partners.  Essentially, the company started to dump physical capital in 
favor of customer relationship capital.
5.6 Conclusion 
There are three main lessons to be learned from Enron’s business model.  First it shows 
the power of becoming an industry standard.  As a matter of fact, standards facilitate 
everybody’s daily life, exemplified by each time we pick up a phone or when we call up 
the plumber to change a pipe in th bathroom.  Second it illustrates how to build a 
business on the exchange model, such as stock exchanges.  Third it demonstrates the vital 
need for companies to identify and focus on their core competency. 
6 Summary 
CHAPTER 2 examined four case studies to describe current business model trends in the 
e-World based on Tapscott’s classification matrix.  Dell’s key success factors were 
identified to be its innovative direct business model, its continuous customer foc and its 
exemplary value chain integration.  Likewise, we extracted three major characteristics 
from eBay’s example: look for opportunities to create new value, leverage community 
effects and develop a trustful environment.  The Linux phenomenon highlight d three 
other trends: treat customers (users) as co-developers, release early / release often and 
keep in mind that network effects can overturn Brooks’s law (law of diminishing return 
for software engineers).  Finally, Enron’s business model was the last of CHAPTER 2’s 
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case studies and proved to rely on three main principles: seek the standard status, build on 
the exchange model (financial market model), and understand your best strategic role in 
the whole value chain (=identify and concentrate on your core competency). 
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CHAPTER 3: AN E-AEROSPACE 
INDUSTRY?  
1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the e-World as it is today in the Aerospace industry.  After 
examining current Aerospace industry companies utilizing the Internet to co duct 
business, we focus our attention on Lockheed Martin and Exostar.  Our ultimate goal is to 
analyze the impact e-world trends observed in the previous chapter on the Aerospace 
industry.  The final section of this chapter proposes a framework to structure both the 
comparative study of Lean and e-World concepts in CHAPTER 4 and the policy analysis 
in CHAPTER 5. 
2 E-Trends in the Aerospace Industry 
2.1 One more attempt to size the Internet mania? 
CHAPTER 2 was an attempt to make sense out of the Internet mania.  Tapscott’s value 
integration/hierarchical control matrix was used in order to classify the various ventures 
mushroming on, via, through, over, or with the Internet.  This section focuses on 
business-to-business (B2B) commerce and especially on business-to-busine s commerce 
conducted in the Aerospace industry. 
In November 1999, Goldman Sachs evaluated the size of B2B for the Aerospace/Defense 
electronics industry to total $76.6 billion in 2004, representing an estimated 35% of the 
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industry’s total business transactions78.  As discussed in CHAPTER 2, online trade 
projections are constantly increasing, or at least, were constantly increasing until the 
March 2000 downturn in the Nasdaq.  Adjusting Goldman Sachs’s November 1999 
estimates with GartnerGroup’s latest B2B projections (almost $6trillion for 200479) gives 
an increased evaluation of approximately $300bn for B2B transactions in the Aerospace 
industry in 200480.  Who are the players contributing to online trade in the aerospace 
industry? This is the question we address now. 
2.2 Aerospace B2B players 
The aerospace industry, like al  other industry, has had a plethora of dot-coms trying to 
reap the benefit of the Internet rush.  As earlier illustrated, trying to size an Internet 
phenomenon can end up being a pretty frustrating exercise.  New players constantly enter 
the market, change names, merge with other players while a countless number also exit 
the market bankrupt.  Under these circumstances, it is difficult, if not totally impossible, 
to give a comprehensive list of the current Aerospace B2B players.  At best we can 
mention a few company names that seem to be more successful than others and might 
remain longer in the arena.  The following list was established in November 2000 after a 
search for the words “aerospace” AND “e-business” OR “ebusiness” on the Lexis-Nexis 
database section for business and finance publications.  It resulted in over 300 articles 
dating from May 2000 to November 2000 and the companies mentioned in the following 
table (Table 3) were often81 cited. 
                                         
78 Goldman Sachs Investment Research, B2B: 2B or Not 2B?, November 12, 1999, 38 
79 refer to CHAPTER 1, 1 The Internet Phenomenon 
80 As seen in CHAPTER 1, 1 The Internet Phenomenon, G ldman Sachs total B2B projections for 2004 
were approximately $1.5trillion, compared to almost $6trillion for Gartner Groups March 2001’s 
projections.  All other proportions kept equal, that leads to an approximate $300bn for B2B in the 
Aerospace industry ($76.6bn * $6tr/$1.5tr) 
81 “Often” is a rather vague frequency measure.  The ideal research would have scanned each single article 
precisely and counted the number of times each company was quoted.  Knowing the high v latility of this 
sort of information, we decided to let this work to Wall Street analysts focusing on e-aer space stocks. 
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Table 3: Aerospace B2B companies 
A quick look at this sample of B2B companies shows that most of them do not offer 
much more than procurement services.  As a matter of fact, even though MyAircraft 
mentions “customer/supplier collaboration”, even Exostar82, which is today the most 
advanced marketplace in the Aerospace industry, still does not enable online 
collaboration with all its suppliers and customers83. 
3 Case Study: Lockheed Martin Corporation / Exostar 
This section focuses more precisely on the Aerospace industry by looking more closely at 
Lockheed Martin Corporation and their utilization of Exostar.  They are a leading 
                                         
82 See following section for more information on Exostar 
83 An article by Aviation Week & Space Technology of March 5 2001 mentions the newly formed 
partnership between Exostar and PTC to provide Internet-based manufacturing services. 
Company Product / Service Offering Source
1 Skyfish direct purchases of airlines
Incorporate Demand and Supply Chain application into one 
system
Integrate procurement software
B2B trading hub
Commuter/Regional Airline News
7/10/2000
2 AeroV, Inc online exchange for Airline parts, supplies and servicesCommuter/Regional Airline News
7/10/2000
3 AviationX (example of a 
strategy shift in an infant 
industry
create web-based software applications for regional airlinesFlight International
5/16/2000
4 Myboeingfleet.com Parts catalog - millions of engineering drawings for all Boeing 
and McDonnell Douglas airliners and a searchable parts list
C mmuter/Regional Airline News
7/03/2000
Flight International
5/16/2000
Airline Business 08/01/2000
5 My Aircraft 1) Supply Chain Management
customer / supplier collaboration
2) Trading / e-Procurement
eWEEK from ZDWire 8/07/2000
(antitrust problem)
Flight International
5/16/2000
6 AeroXchange online exchange for Airline parts, supplies and servicesInvestment Dealers Digest
11/06/2000
7 Aerospan.com procurement services Flight International
5/16/2000
8 Exostar procurement services
electronic supply chain management
online collaboration
Investor's Business Daily
November 16, 2000
9 Partsbase.com Parts catalog  Airline Business
8/01/2000
10 Spec2000.com Parts exchange - common data standard for buying and 
selling spare parts
Airline Business
8/01/2000
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airframe supplier and integrator as well as a pioneer in implementing Internet 
technologies in their business activities.  The following section on Lockheed Martin and 
Exostar is based on information from a recent LAI workshop84. 
3.1 Background Information on Lockheed Martin Corporation 
3.1.1 Overview85 
Formed by the merger of defense giants Lockheed and Martin Marietta, Lockheed Martin 
makes aircraft such as the F-16 fighter and the C-130J transport plane and high-tech 
flight systems for missiles such as the submarine-launched Trident II and the Theater 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). It is also involved in many other activities 
including space launch vehicles and communications satellites, as well as, ship and 
submarine combat systems, air-control systems and fire-control systems.  Our interest is 
not on any specific program but rather on Lockheed Martin’s use of Aerospace exchange 
Exostar that it co-founded. 
3.1.2 Aerospace enterprise roadmap with current B2B ventures 
The following figure is a high-level roadmap illustrating the interactions as well as the 
flows of information and products between the various stakeholders of the Lockheed 
Martin Enterprise86. 
                                         
84 Lean Aerospace Initiative Implementation Workshop, Building Internet-Enabled Integrated Value 
Networks, January 30-31, 2001 
85 From Hoover’s Inc. on Dow Jones Interactive on April 24, 2001 
86 In fact this roadmap was developed without any particular focus on any specific company.  Here it is 
used to describe Lockheed Martin but it is much more general and could apply to many other companies. 
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Figure 5: Lockheed (Company X)'s enterprise value stream map 
Currently, most B2B players are located between “Produce Product” and “Suppliers and 
Supply Chain Management”, as well as between “Support Product Service’ and “External 
Customer”. 
3.2 Background Information on Exostar 
3.2.1 Overview 
Exostar was officially founded in September 2000 by BAE Systems, Boeing, Lockheed 
Martin and Raytheon with CommerceOne as technology partner.  Exostar is aimed at 
becoming an “open neutral exchange for the Global Aerospace and Defense Industry, 
open to all participants and all tiers ”.  Allen Golland, program manager at Lockheed 
Corporation, defines a B2B exchange as a “mechanism to bring together many trading 
partners buyers and sellers, customers and suppliers, using common web-based software 
and new tools and techniques, providing streamlined ordering capability and providing 
relevant business services.” 
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3.2.2 Exostar’s product and service offerings 
Exostar’s product and service offerings are very mbitious and go well beyond mere 
electronic procurement.  Among the services it plans to offer, we can find: managed 
content, automated transaction support, supply chain services, selling services, direct 
procurement, community services, collaboration, indirect procurement and auction 
services (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Exostar's product and service offerings 
However appealing this variety of product and services might seem, it is important to
keep in mind that most B2B marketplaces still simply process procurement transactions 
via Exostar, using online catalog buying and in some cases reverse auctions.  The next 
steps towards direct procurement and then support for supply chain collaboration still set 
some challenges. The following two figures illustrate Lockheed Martin’s concept of B2B 
collaborative environment and LMT’s ebusiness roadmap (Figure 7 nd Figure 8). 
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Figure 7: B2B Collaborative Environment 
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Figure 8: eBusiness Roadmap  
In essence Exostar’s product and service offerings reflect top managements’strategic 
move towards what LAI87 calls the Lean Enterprise.  The key Lean ingredients are 
represented in Figure 7 and Figure 8.  Exostar’s collaborative environment clearly 
enables Womack’s five Lean principles (see CHAPTER 1 on Lean Thinking): value 
because customers are included in the collaborative environment; value stream, 
customer-pull and perfection result from customer/supplier partnerships; finally flow 
management is optimized in an information technology environment. 
From the concepts present on the previous two figures, it seems that the Aerospace 
industry has nothing to learn from the e-World fruitflies.  Nevertheless, if the general 
principles are already in place, at least in top managers’s minds, nobody is really sure of 
how the e-World trends that were identified in CHAPTER 2 will translate to other 
industries such as aerospace.  The following section provides a framework to structure 
                                         
87 The Lean Aerospace Initiative is a research group at MIT. More will be said about LAI in CHAPTER 4. 
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the comparison between the Aerospace industry (represented by Lockheed Martin) and 
the e-World trends observed in CHAPTER 1. 
4 Framework for comparison 
From the previous sections, it is tempting to believe that any e-World trends could 
somehow transfer to a business environment such as Lockheed Martin’s.  Indeed, one 
might ask why it is that the Aerospace seems so late at adopting best business practices 
from the Dell model.  Before we actually study in details the impact of the e-World 
(CHAPTER 4), this section provides a framework to analyze how the e-W rld trends 
introduced in CHAPTER 1, and especially the Dell model (i.e. Dell with Dellonline), 
could translate to the Aerospace industry (i.e. Lockheed Martin with Exostar), and what 
elements make the two industries differ so much.  This analysis focuses on macro 
considerations, concentrating on Enterprise stakeholder, product and production issues.
4.1 Enterprise stakeholders 
4.1.1 Stakeholders 
The first key difference between the Dell enterprise and the Lockheed Martin enterprise 
lies in their respective stakeholders: customers (channels and endusers), suppliers, 
employees, shareholders, competitors (existing and potential new entrants), the B2B 
exchange (dellonline for Dell and Exostar for Lockheed), and the public (regulation 
authorities). 
Customers at Dell in general are multinational companies rather than individual users,
which is also the case for Lockheed.  However Dell does not have any dominant 
customer which could have a real threatening bargaining power on Dell’s operations88, 
whereas Lockheed Martin, when working on a military program, clearly has to face the 
                                         
88 As mentioned in Dell’s case study, no customer at Dell, represent more than 1-2% of Dell’s total 
revenue.  For reference see footnote number 51.
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unbeatable bargaining power of the US Department of Defense.  Dell’s customers’s 
bargaining power (one of the five forces of Michael Porter89) is thus clearly lower than 
Lockheed Martin’s customers’s. 
Other issues to bear in mind concerning customers are their numb r, mix, bargaining 
power and whether there is a direct contact between the company and its customers or if 
there is an intermediary channel.  Similarly it is important to understand that suppliers are 
much different across industries: total number, number of tiers, and bargaining power 
must be considered.  Shareholders are also important stakeholders to take into account: 
their mix, the presence of a dominant shareholder influence decisions differently in 
various industries.  Employees and consideratio about their number, the power of 
unions and the average staff level of education clearly pressure business managers.  
Finally, B2B exchanges (Dellonline for Dell and Exostar for Lockheed Martin) obviously 
face different problems according to their potential market power and regulatory bodies 
are more concerned about the potential market power of Exostar than of that of 
Dellonline. 
4.1.2 Industry maturity 
Professor Charles Fine, author of Clockspeed, draws an analogy between the molecular 
structure of DNA and the structure of companies, explaining how indutries continuously 
evolve between vertical and horizontal structures on an infinite loop. “Business genetics 
features the industrial equivalent of the double helix – a model based on an infinite 
double loop tha cycles between vertically integrated industries inhabited by corporate 
behemoths and horizontally disintegrated industries populated by myriad of innovators, 
each seeking a niche in the wide open space left by the earlier demise of the giants.90” 
                                         
89 For a fuller discussion, see M.E. Porter, C mpetitive Strategy, Free Press, 1980 
90 Charles H. Fine, Clockspeed – Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage, Perseus 
Books, 1998, 43
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Based on this theory, industry maturity becomes an important component of our 
framework.  Andrew Grove, in his book “Only the Paranoid Survive”, showed how the 
computer industry evolved from a vertical industry structure with an integral product 
architecture and two main players (IBM and DEC) between 1975 and 1985 to a 
horizontal industry structure and modular product architecture with a multitude of players 
(Intel, Microsoft, Apple, IBM, Lotus, Seagate, DEC, HP, Compaq, Dell, etc.) between 
1985 and 199591.  The Aerospace industry, though at a much slower pace, is moving 
towards a more and more horizontal structure with modular product architecture.  Due to 
product complexity, it is difficult however to discuss the whole Aerospace industry at the 
same level as the PC industry.  In terms of products, one might just be able to compare 
avionics systems in an airplane to personal computers.  As we will see next when 
analyzing the product difference, some products of the Aerospace industry are necessarily 
highly technically integrated, with and are produced within a group of tightly integrated 
set of companies and suppliers. 
4.2 Product 
4.2.1 Component clockspeed 
Addressing a list of each single component of a computer would be a tedious task, 
needless to think about realizing a similar counting with an aerospace vehicle such as 
produced by Lockheed Martin.  A fighter aircraft is obviously a much more complex 
product than a PC.  To simplify our analysis, let us reduce the complexity of an airplane 
to three components: airframe, hardware electronics, and software.  Likewise a computer 
can be reduced to a mix of hardware and software. 
One crucial difference between those various components is their rate of innovation, or 
what Professor Fine calls their clockspeed.  Both hardware and software have very high 
clockspeeds:  Microsoft releases a new operating system about every couple years with 
                                         
91 Andrew S. Grove, Only the Paranoid Survive, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1996, 40. 
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very frequent upgrades of each product and Intel produces faster microprocessors every 
year.  Airframes, on the contrary, have much slower clockspeed of about 10 years or 
longer: Boeing creates a totally new plane roughly every 20 years. 
4.2.2 Product architecture 
Components, as we have just mentioned, have different clockspeed. They also “interact” 
differently with one another, depending on the architecture of th  p oduct itself.  
Professor Fine distinguishes between integral and modular product architectures92, a 
distinction that is fundamental to defining process and supply chain management.  As 
Professor Fine notes, integral architecture might feature, for ex mple: components that 
perform many functions, components that are in close proximity or close spatial 
relationship, or components that are tightly synchronized.  In contrast, a modular 
architecture features separation among a system’s constituent parts whereby: components 
are interchangeable, components are individually upgradable, component interfaces are 
interchangeable, and/or system failures can be localized. 
PC’s, and Dell’s PCs especially, are highly modular.  As a matter of fact, Dell does not 
manufacture any components itself but only assembles them according to customers’ 
preferences.  On the contrary, control software for a weapon system have very high 
performance requirements which give them a necessarily highly integrated product 
architecture. 
4.3 Production 
4.3.1 Supply chain 
Building on the product architecture concept enables development of the construct of 
supply chain architecture.  The supply chain architecture, like the product architecture 
can be integral or modular.  Integral supply chain architecture, as explained by Professor 
                                         
92 Charles H. Fine, Clockspeed – Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary advantage,Perseus 
Book, 1998, 134. 
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Fine, is defined by four categories of proximity: geographic, organizational, cultural, and 
electronic93.  Dell’s supply chain for example is integral, not because of geographic 
proximity, but essentially because of electronic proximity.  Similarly, CAD/CAM 
systems allow electronic proximity for Lockheed Martin’s engineers. 
4.3.2 Process architecture 
Like the architectures for the product and supply chain, it can also be useful to locate the 
process architecture along the line extending from the extremes of vertical-integral and 
horizontal-modular.  Professor Fine, once more, describes both extremes in two 
dimensions: space and time94.  That is, process architectures can be integrated in both 
time and space (highly integral), integrated in either space or time, or dispersed in both 
space and time (highly modular).  Dell’s assembly process for example is tightly 
integrated in time.  An entire computer is built in a few hours to be rushed off to its future 
owner.  Dell’s assembly process is tightly integrated in space as well: all assembly 
operations take place in a single work cell in a single factory, operated by a very small 
team. 
5 Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of how the Aerospace industry follows the e-Wor d 
trends with very ambitious ventures such as Exostar.  If, as noted by IDC research95, the 
forecasted growth for emarketplaces has been greatly anticipated, we saw that Exostar 
has plans that go far beyond mere indirect procurement services.  Nevertheless, the 
Aerospace industry is still clearly in its infancy in applying e-World business practices 
                                         
93Charles H. Fine, Clockspeed – Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary advantage, Perseus 
Book, 1998, 137 
94 Charles H. Fine, Clockspeed – Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary advantage,Perseus 
Book, 1998, 143 
95 Sep 15 2000: IDC’s report describes calls for thousands of emarketplaces by 2004 as “ovrzealous”.  The 
report makes a more conservative estimate, and claims that only several hundred emarketplaces will exist 
by that time (more details at http://www.idc.com/Services/press/PR/SV091300pr.stm) 
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such as Dell’s.  Figure 9 illustrates the different scopes to date of the Internet’s impact on 
key process interfaces (represented by dots) on Company X, representative of the 
Aerospace industry versus Company Y, representing Dell Corporation.  Various factors 
(stakeholders, product and production) provide for differences between the two industries 
and explain why e-World trends are, to date, at two distinct levels of maturity in their 
business applications at Dell and at Lockheed.  This framework introduced in CHAPTER 
3 will provide a structure to compare the emerging e-Wo ld trends and conclusions of 
CHAPTER 2 with the Aerospace lean enterprise trends.  This analysis and mapping are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Figure 9: Internet usage in Aerospace industry (top) VS Internet usage at Dell Corporation (bottom) 
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CHAPTER 4: A MAPPING BETWEEN 
LEAN AND THE E-WORLD?  
1 Introduction 
Lean manufacturing has been central to major research efforts in the last decade.  
Substantial work was undertaken to evolve the conventional scope of Lean (i.e. Lean
manufacturing) to other functions of the enterprise such as product design, product 
development and supply chain management.  Many aerospace organizations are activily 
engaged in extending Lean across their current value chain, both internally and externally 
to their supplier base. 
This chapter examines the Lean Enterprise Model, a taxonomy of Lean principles and 
practices.  Subsequently, a set of e-World principles are extracted from the case studies of 
CHAPTER 2 and compared to the Lean principles.  If some overlap between Lean and 
the e-World may seem intuitive, other interaction effects require a more detailed analysis 
to be thoroughly understood. This is the subject of this chapter.
2 The Lean Enterprise Model (LEM) 
2.1 Overview 
The Lean Enterprise Model (LEM) is a contribution by the Lean Aerospace Initiative 
(LAI) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).  The LAI is a research 
partnership among the U.S. government, labor, MIT, and defense aerospace busin sses.  
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Formally launched in 1993, the initial research focused on the aircraft sector but it also 
expanded its research focus to include the space sector in 1998.  Work in the research 
partnership now involves both aircraft and spacecraft sectors.  The LEM not only applies 
to aerospace businesses, but to other industries as well.  The LEM consists of Meta-
principles, Enterprise Principles, Enterprise Metrics, Overarching Practices (OAPs), and 
Enabling Practices that describe the Lean Enterprise.  A graphic representation of the 
LEM structure is shown in Figure 10. 
Figure 10: the Lean Enterprise Model (LEM) 
2.2 The Lean Principles 
The LEM (Figure 10) makes use of a tiered terminology to describe the Lean Enterprise.  
At the highest level “Responsiveness to Change” and “Waste Elimination” represent the 
Meta-principles; “Right Thing, Right Place, Right Time, Right Quantity”, “Effective 
Relationships within the Value Stream”, “Continuous Improvement” and “Optimal First 
Delivered Unit Quantity” correspond to the Enterprise principles.  The objective of this 
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chapter is to examine the LEM at a more detailed level and to put the Overarching 
Practices (also referred to as “Lean Principles”) side by side with the e-World trends. 
The following table (Table 4) exhibits the description of the 12 Overarching principles 
(OAPs), numbered OAP1 through OAP12. 
Table 4: The Lean Principles - From the Lean Enterprise Model: http://lean.mit.edu 
The twelve principles deal with enterprise product and information flow (OAP 1 and 2), 
stakeholder and organization issues (OAP 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 10) as well as process and 
program management (OAP 5, 9, 11, and 10). 
Overarching 
Practice
Title Description
OAP 1 Identify and optimize enterprise flow "Optimize the flow of products and services either 
affecting or within the process, from concept 
design through point of use."
OAP 2 Assure seamless information flow "Provide processes for seamless and timely 
transfer of and access to pertinent information."
OAP 3 Optimize capability and utilization of people "Assure properly trained people are available when 
needed."
OAP 4 Make decisions at the lowest possible level "Design the organizational structure and 
management systems to accelerate and enhance 
decision making at the point of knowledge, 
application, and need."
OAP 5 Implement integrated product and process development "Create products through an integrated team effort 
of people and organizations which are 
knowledgeable of and responsible for all phases of 
the product's life cycle from concept definition 
through development, production, deployment, 
operations and support, and final disposal."
OAP 6 Develop relationships based on mutual trust and commitment"Establish stable and on-going cooperative 
relationships within the extended enterprise, 
encompassing both customers and suppliers."
OAP 7 Continuously focus on the customer "Proactively understand and respond to the needs 
of the internal and external customers."
OAP 8 Promote lean leadership at all level "Align and involve all stakeholders to achieve the 
enterprise's lean vision."
OAP 9 Maintain challenge of existing processes "Ensure a culture and systems that use quantitative 
measurement and analysis to continuously improve 
processes."
OAP 10 Nurture a learning environment "Provide for the development and growth of both 
organizations' and individuals' support of attaining 
lean enterprise goals."
OAP 11 Ensure process capability and maturation "Establish and maintain processes capable of 
consistently designing and producing the key 
characteristics of the product or service."
OAP 12 Maximize stability in a changing environment "Establish strategies to maintain program stability 
in a changing customer driven environment."
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2.3 The Lean principles interaction matrix 
The Lean Enterprise Model is a framework to capture lean practices.  There are many 
interactions between the different practices listed.  These interactions impact the 
effectiveness or realization of other practices.  Each practice has some impact on the 
other practices.  The following table (T 5) is taken from the LEM online tool.  It 
shows an estimate of the extent of these interactions. These interactions are not 
empirically derived nor validated. However, numerous practitioners have found that they 
afford insight into important relationships inherent in the LEM. 
Table 5: OAP interaction matrix 
OAP1 OAP2 OAP3 OAP4 OAP5 OAP6 OAP7 OAP8 OAP9 OAP10 OAP11 OAP12
Flow 1
Information 2
People 3
Decisions 4
IPPD 5
Relationships 6
Customer 7
Leadership 8
Processes 9
Learning 10
Capability 11
Requirement 12
LEGEND: Prerequisite Strong Impact Moderate Impact Limited Impact
Flow CapabilityProcessesCustomerIPPDPeople
Information Decisions Relationships Leadership Learning Requirement
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Reading from the rows on the left, the overarching practice impacts the overarching 
practice in the column as depicted in the intersecting cell (see key for strength of impact). 
For example, “Seamless Information Flow” (OAP2) is a prerequisite for “Make decisions 
at the lowest level” (OAP4).  In turn, "Make decisions at the lowest possible level" 
strongly impacts the overarching practice "Develop relationships based on mutual trust 
and commitment (OAP6)."  
3 The E-World as an enabler to Lean 
3.1 e-World principles (trends) 
CHAPTER 2 examined four case studies to describe current business model trends in the 
e-World.  Dell’s key success factors were identified to be its innovative direct bus n ss 
model, its continuous customer focus and its exemplary value chain integration.  
Likewise, we extracted three vital characteristics from eBay’s example: look for 
opportunities to create value, leverage community effects and develop a trustful 
environment.  The Linux phenomenon highlighted three other trends: treat customers 
(users) as co-developers, release early / release often and keep in mind that network 
effects can overturn Brooks’s law (law of diminishing return for software programmers).  
Enron’s business model was the last of our case studies and proved to rely on three main 
principles: seek the standard status, build on the exchange model (financial market 
model), understand your best strategic role in the whole value chain (=identify and 
concentrate on your core competency).  Table 6 summarizes the e-World principles. 
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Table 6: The e-World Principles 
3.2 The e-World principles support the Lean principles 
Putting the e-World principles side by side with the Lean principles (see Table 7) shows 
how the two set of principles interact with one another.  Let us now examine more in 
detail how each one of the e-World principles relates to the Lean principles (OAPs). 
Table 7: e-World and Lean principles 
e-W 1 Sell directly (bypass the middleman / Direct Business 
Model)
OAP 1 Identify and optimize enterprise 
flow
e-W 2 Focus on end-customer OAP 2 Assure seamless information flow
e-W 3 Integrate the whole supply chain OAP 3 Optimize capability and utilization 
of people
e-W 4 Look for opportunities to create value (NOT from 
customer pull)
OAP 4 Make decisions at the lowest 
possible level
e-W 5 Leverage community effects OAP 5 Implement integrated product and 
process development
e-W 6 Develop a trustful environment OAP 6 Develop relationships based on 
mutual trust and commitment
e-W 7 Treat customers (users) as co-developers OAP 7 Continuously focus on the 
customer
e-W 8 Release early / Release often OAP 8 Promote lean leadership at all 
level
e-W 9 Network effects transform the law of dimishing 
returns in increasing return!
OAP 9 Maintain challenge of existing 
processes
e-W 10 Seek the standard status OAP 10 Nurture a learning environment
e-W 11 Build on the exchange model (financial market 
model)
OAP 11 Ensure process capability and 
maturation
e-W 12 Identify and concentrate on your core competencyOAP 12 Maximize stability in a changing 
environment
e-World 
Principle
Title Source
e-W 1 Sell directly (bypass the middleman / Direct Business Model)Dell case study
e-W 2 Focus on end-customer Dell case study
e-W 3 Integrate the whole supply chain Dell case study
e-W 4 Look for opportunities to create value (NOT from customer pull)eBay case study
e-W 5 Leverage community effects eBay case study
e-W 6 Develop a trustful environment eBay case study
e-W 7 Treat customers (users) as co-developers Linux phenomenon case study
e-W 8 Release early / Release often Linux phenomenon case study
e-W 9 Network effects transform the law of dimishing returns in 
increasing return!
Linux phenomenon case study
e-W 10 Seek the standard status Enron case study
e-W 11 Build on the exchange model (financial market model) Enron case study
e-W 12 Identify and concentrate on your core competency Enron case study
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3.2.1 Impact on OAP2: Seamless information flow 
Before starting with the systematic approach, it is probably worth noting that one of the 
most obvious impacts of e-World trends i  that they improve seamless information flows 
(OAP2).  A plethora of publications describe how the Internet speed of information 
changes the traditional economics of products.  One strategy, described by Evans and 
Wurster, author of the book “Bl wn to Bits” is to separate the information-rich part of the 
business from the commodity part, and sell them separately.  In order to support this 
strategy, they define the traditional tradeoff between richness and reach96 of information.  
Reach simply means the number of people, at home or at work, exchanging information.  
Richness is defined by three aspects of the information itself.  The first is bandwidth, or 
the amount of information that can be moved from sender to receiver in a given time.  
The second aspect is the degree to which the information can be customized.  For 
example, an advertisement on television is far less customized than a personal sales pitch 
but reaches far more people.  The third aspect is interactivity.  Dialogue is possible for a 
small group, but to reach millions of people the message must be a monologue.  In 
general, the communication is rich if information has required proximity and dedicated 
channels whose costs or physical constraints have limited the size of the audience to 
which the information could be sent.  Conversely, the communication of information to a 
large audience has required compromises in bandwidth, customization, and interactivity 
(see Figure 11). 
                                         
96Evans and Wurster, Blown to Bits, October 1999. 
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Figure 11: The Impact of the Internet on the Traditional Economics of Information 
The Internet shifts the Reach/Richness curve outwards and eliminates the traditional 
tradeoff. More people have access to richer information that flows seamlessly. 
The companies tha  have gone the furthest in their usage of the Internet claim to save 
astonishing amounts, especially in transaction costs.  GE plans to cut 15% from its cost 
base of $100 billion in both 2001 and 2002.  That is five times the typical annual growth 
in productivity, even for this fast-moving firm, of 3-4%.  In addition, the company hopes 
to reduce the prices of the materials it buys by making most of its purchases in electronic 
auctions.  That should save a further $2 billion over the next two years97. 
                                         
97 The Economist, E-Management Survey November 2000 
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3.2.2 Impact of  e-W1, e-W2, e-W3 (Dell) 
Undoubtedly, e-W1 (Dell’s Sell directly) impacts OAP1 (Flow): As previously described 
in CHAPTER 2, the Dell- ike Internet enabled - nterprise can better optimize the flow of 
products and services.  The inventory level provides a direct measure of the efficiency of 
an enterprise’s flow.  By the mid 1990s, Dell’s work-in-process (WIP) and finished 
goods inventory as a percent of total inventory ranged from 10% to 20%.  This contrasted 
sharply with the industry leaders, such as Compaq, Apple and IBM, whose WIP and 
finished goods inventory typically ranged from 50% to 70% of total inventory, not 
including inventory held by their resellers98. 
Dell’s customer focus principle (e-W2) is very close to the lean customer focus (OAP7).  
In the e-World, emphasis is placed on the end-customer rather than on the next tier 
supplier, which really reinforces Womack’s (customer) pull principle.  Curiously 
however, the current description of OAP7 specifies that the customer is both the internal 
and the external customer (see Tabl  4).  Of course both internal and external customers 
have their importance.  It would be foolish for any supplier to neglect its most dir  
customer and only focus on the end-customer. Dell’s example shows how all the 
suppliers watch the same information to coordinate their value creating efforts, like the 
musicians of an orchestra observing precisely the conductor to adjust their play.  A  
companies install software applications to take over many of the tasks that employees 
now do—such as “running errands” to keep information moving—they alter the balance 
between the internal and external demands on a company, an issue described in a book 
called “Harmony: Business, Technology & Life After Paperwork” by Arno Penzias, 
former boss of Bell Labs.  “Though to my knowledge no computer has yet managed to 
replicate the performance of a single office worker,” he says, “the right combination of 
computing and communications can frequently replace whole departments.”  The 
“errands” jobs are not only wasteful; they turn the attention of organizations inwards 
towards the smooth operation of internal processes, rather than outwards to the customer.  
                                         
98 For further details, refer to case study in CHAPTER 2 
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Now, though, Internet-based software applications are shifting the balance, shrinking the 
amount of human time and effort that needs to be spent on internal co-ordinatio  and 
fostering end-customer focus. 
It is also worth noting that e-W2 is very related to e-W7 (users=co-developers).  Yet 
again Dell’s definition of customers is closer to Linux’s definition of users/co-develop rs 
than to Lean’s customer pull principle.  Dell’s Premier Pages are a key element of Dell’s 
close contact to its customers.  They are obviously creating a customer pull for the whole 
Dell enterprise since all suppliers can instantaneously know what the end-customer nee s 
are but also they are an interactive tool where Dell’s major customers participate in the 
conception of the product and service they want.  Arguably, Dell is able to anticipate the 
needs of its customers with such accuracy that it is questionable whether the customer is 
pulling or Dell is pushing. 
e-W3 (Supply Chain Integration) is associated to OAP5 (Implement Integrated Product 
and Process development) but also has a component of e-W12 (understand your core 
competency).  It also supports OAP1 (Enterprise Flow) 
There is one important caveat concerning Dell principle e-W3.  As previously 
demonstrated in the case study, if processes are tightly integrated (Space and Time) as in 
Dell’s example, its product architectures are very modular.  In contrast, the LEM was 
developed primarily for the aerospace community and OAP5 (IPPD) seems to apply 
especially to highly integrated product architectures.  The OAP5 (IPPD) description 
underlines the importance of a single integrated team effort to be knowledgeable for all 
phases of the product’s life cycle, which is not as critical in a modular product 
architecture. 
Finally, Dell’s e-W3 (integrate the whole supply chain) is a key to reinforce and foster 
trust (OAP6) among all stakeholders. 
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3.2.3 Impact of e-W4, e-W5, e-W6 (eBay) 
e-W4 (opportunities to create value), in the case of eBay, can be interpreted as a very 
good understanding of customer needs and would therefore be very consistent with the 
Lean definition of value creation - originated by a customer pull. 
Ford provides another example of a company trying to define a new market (a new value) 
for its customer.  This new value (e-W4), ven ifjust interpreted as a new distribution 
channel, combined with e-W1 (Dell’s direct sales) is a clear pressure towards bypassing 
car dealers.  However that would need to redefine the whole value chain (e-W3 and e-
W12) and to overcome a few transitional problems (in many States car dealers are legal 
entities with franchises; their business is recognized and supported by law99).  In an
case, should we call it an opportunity to create new value or just an opportunity to benefit 
from a direct customer pull, the Internet clearly puts pressure on the structure of the 
automotive value chain (see Figure 12).  While the auto manufacturers are locked into a 
distribution system that puts power in the hands of local dealerships, start-ups are 
courting online buyers and signing partners to establish new digital value systems.  Many 
of them (e.g. Autobytel and CarPrices.com) are still partnering with existing dealerships.  
Another contender, CarOrder, however, aims to “disintermediate” auto ealerships by 
moving the entire distribution model to the Web.  Like eCoverage, CarOrder wants to 
make the traditional industry model a piece of history.  In reality, these e-Ven ures hav  
recently suffered from the high-tech bubble burst and the Nasdaq downturn, but their 
long-term prospects matters less than the simple fact that thousands of such companies 
have been targeting business processes in virtually every industry.  Even if eCoverage 
and CarOrder fail today, it is hard to imagine that the whole concept will disappear 
forever. 
                                         
99 Over 22,000 car dealers in the United States are pro cted by franchise agreements and state regulations. 
Source: Mary J. Cronin, U chained Value, HBS Press 2000, 40.
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Figure 12: Creating value by enabling an end customer pull100 
e-W5 (leverage community effects) has a huge impact on Lean principles: reinforcing 
OAP4 (decisions at the lowest level), OAP5 (IPPD), OAP6 (relationships based on 
mutual trust), OAP7 (customer) and OAP10 (learning) but seems inconsistent with OAP1 
(Flow) and OAP3 (capability and utilization of people).  e-W5 originates from an eBay 
principle.  The underlying concept is to rely on a community of users to create value.  If 
this is something natural for a Linux programmer, it is much less so for any traditional 
manufacturer.  One could argue that the eBay communities do not create tangible (thus 
monetary) value.  For eBay, the social and community aspects are its key survival 
elements.  After all, even if eBay benefits from first mover advantage, switching costs 
should not be high for its users (were it not for the community environment) and its 
business model really should not be difficult to copy.  As a matter of fact, it really proved 
difficult for Yahoo! and Amazon to enter eBay’s market, hence the social component of 
e-W5.  What does that mean for the LEM then?  The long-term impact is difficult to 
guess.  Should managers try to define th ir extended e-enterprise in terms of community 
benefits for its stakeholders?  The complexity of the aerospace community as well as its 
high-tech products and high skill requirements make “switching” very difficult.  In any 
case, building a community certainly requires abandoning control to seek the benefits of 
network effects.  In that sense, e-W5 makes OAP1 and OAP3 challenging.  Since the 
                                         
100 Source: Professor Nightingale’s class material
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boundaries of a community are not clearly defined, how can one identify and optimize 
enterprise flows (OAP1) or, even more challenging, optimize capability and utilization of 
people (OAP3)?  This leads to a necessary trade-off between understand/optimize the 
whole enterprise flow and build on network/community effects. 
e-W6 (develop a trustful environment) is a cruc al component of e-world ventures and 
clearly reinforces the Lean concept of trust in OAP6 (Relationships based on mutual 
trust).  In part 1, we illustrated this argument with eBay’s trust and safety policies (see 
case study).  eBay managers first neglected th  press challenging them but soon 
understood that its core value built on strong community relationships among its users 
was seriously threatened. But a trustful environment is also a key element of Dell’s 
model as well as Enron’s; and the Linux phenomenon would never have occurred without 
trust among the Linux community or Enron’s partners.  As the case studies show, 
network effects combined with community bonds in eBay and Linux are vital to creating 
a de facto trustful environment. 
3.2.4 Impact of e-W7, e-W8, e-W9 (Linux) 
e-W7 (users=co-developers) is a concept highlighted by the Linux phenomenon but also 
as earlier discussed by Dell’s model (Premier Pages).  Depending on one’s interpretation 
of OAP4 (Make decision at the lowest possible level), one can argue th t e-W7 impacts 
OAP4.  The underlying assumption is that the lowest possible level of OAP4 would 
include the end customer.  This is reflected in the Enabling Practice “delegate or share 
responsibility for decisions throughout the value chain”. In Dell’s model, this clearly 
involves the end-customers.  Both the Premier Pages and the Councils are unique 
collaboration spaces where customers interact to define their needs.  They take full 
responsibility during this process. 
e-W7 also clearly impacts OAP5 (I PD).  For both Dell and Linux, customers are 
integrated in product development (even though not much in process development).  The 
Enabling Practice “Involve all stakeholders early in the requirements definition, design 
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and development process” also reflects the need to include customers in the product 
development loop. 
e-W8 (release early, release often) and e-W9 (negation of Brooks’s law101) are two strong 
disruptive e-world trends for the LEM.  e-W8 is a form of real-time collaboration where 
software programmers work on small pieces of products and let others use their ideas as 
fast as possible.  e-W8 obviously relies on e-W9: because the whole Linux community 
believes in e-W9, they continue to release early and often.  From that perspective, those 
two e-World trends set a real challenge for OAP5 (integration of process and product 
development).  OAP5 is about relying on close teams to integrate the whole product and 
process development whereas e-W8 and e-W9 build on the pervasive and elusive power 
of virtual teams.  More research on that topic would require a focus on team building and 
the efficiency of online collaboration for complex manufacturing goods.  As formerly 
described in the case studies, PalmPilot and Wintel are two successful examples of 
companies building on the intangible value of users working as co-developers.  Both rely 
on open source principles to let user communities develop their own applications and the 
implications for physical goods manufacturers are not straightforward.  Nevertheless 
passing over the trend completely might be a risky bet. 
3.2.5 Impact of e-W10, e-W11, e-W12 (Enron) 
As we will later discuss in CHAPTER 5, there are two ways to learn from Enron’s case 
study.  On one hand, one can benefit from using Enron’s services.  On the other hand, 
one can learn from Enron’s business practices.  This chapter concentrates on the latter 
aspect. 
The most direct correspondence between Enron’s principles and the OAPs is the obvious 
relationship betwen e-W12 (Identify and concentrate on your core competency) and 
OAP1 (Identify and optimize enterprise flow).  The first enabling practice of OAP1 
                                         
101 Brooks’s law is the law of diminishing returns for software engineers, stating that the number of bugs 
increases exponentially with the number of engineers working on a given program. 
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suggests: “Establish models and/or simulations to permit understanding and evaluation of 
the flow process.”  This first step was crucial in Enron’s strategy and decision to spin off 
its power generation business, understanding that its core competency resides elsewhere. 
More interesting is the model of exchanges on which Enron draws to build its own 
business (e-W11).  What are the advantages of organizing a market on the exchange 
model?  As studied in CHAPTER 2, several factors make the exchange model valuable: 
reduced search costs, reduced transactions costs (reduces contract n gotiation time – but
needs uniform contract terms (market driven)), negotiation of short-term and l ng-term 
contracts (spot and forward markets, hedging and risk management), efficient 
aggregation of supply and demand, efficiency in billing, stable rating nd pricing policies 
and contract enforcement.  It would obviously be presumptious to think that the exchange 
model could be applied to any industry or market.  Money, as well as energy, has the 
singular property to be a pure commodity item.  This is reflected in e-W10, which advises 
to seek the status of standard.  After all, the Internet itself increases the importance of 
standards.  Indeed, the glue that holds it together is essentially a set of software standards.  
Their user-f iendly simplicity allows people to use the Internet in many different roles - 
as customers, suppliers, employees, job seekers - without needing to be retrained.  
Electronic commerce needs standards in order to make it easy to transfer information 
between companies with different systems: hence the importance of XML.  In the Lean 
enterprise, standards are crucial to optimize processes, platform operations and 
information transfers.  In this extended sense of e-W10 (standards), there is a clear impact 
of “standards” on OAP2 (Seamless information), OAP5 (IPPD) and OAP11 (Ensure 
process capability and maturation).  In addition, e-W10 arguably impacts OAP1 (Flow) 
as well: “Standards” in that case is interpreted as standardized business practices or 
standard processes that enable better enterprise flows.  With such a model in the 
automotive industry combining the effect of e-W10 and e-W11, one could imagine a 
forward market for certain engine components where one would hedge her portfolio 
against price volatility.  Of course, this scenario presupposes fluctuating prices of engines 
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components, which might seem impossible to current managers.  Let us wait until they all 
trade in auctions like eBay or priceline.  
3.3 Internet impact not directly reflected in e-World principles 
This subsection examines how other common Internet trends not represented in the e-
World principles also impact the Lean principles. 
3.3.1 Online education – Corporate Culture 
“The main thing to remember is that online learning is like the microwave oven: it 
is not a complete replacement for the traditional model, but it does some things 
better.” 
John Coné, Dell Computer Corporation’s head of learning 
OAP10 is entitled “Nurture a learning environment”.  While the 12 e-World trends do not 
directly address the issue of learning, the way we learn is clearly impacted by Internet 
technologies.  Very recently (April 2001), MIT announced that it would place all the 
content of its courses and research on the web102.  Mor  than any previous technology, 
the Internet allows companies to ensure that every employee has access to the corporate 
news, views and vision.  Some companies, such as Boeing for instance, use it to teach 
their employees (as well as suppliers and customers) their ethical code.  Boeing offers an 
online “ethics challenge” where employees can test their moral instincts on such delicate 
issues as “acceptance of business courtesies” and “the minister drops a hint”.  Such 
applications are a way to spread a common approach throughout an organization103.  
Another example of Inter et use for online training is found at Dell.  There, managers, 
too, receive some online training, for example on coaching.  An optional one-day old-
fashioned class is available at the end of the course, but Mr. Coné says that only a small 
                                         
102 But unlike other universities, MIT has not announced any plan to deliver an entirely virtual technology 
based degree. 
103 The Economist, E-Management Survey, November 2000 
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minority signs up for it.  “The only thing we can’t do asynchronously online”, he says, “is 
to have an individual attempt to display a learned behavior, and get immediate feedback 
based on judgment.”  Dell now delivers roughly 60% of all formal learning online, and 
hopes to raise that proportion to 90% within two to three years. 
Similarly OAP8 (Promote lean leadership at all levels), or at least promoting leadership 
and enterprise culture, becomes easier to implement with Internet technologies.  As 
companies become more fragmented and their workers more geographically dispersed, 
managers need a way to rally the troops.  In particular, they need a way to build a 
corporate culture: that intangible something that binds employees together and teaches 
them to understand instinctively the defining qualities of the business and the appropriate 
way to respond to any issue that confronts them.  The Internet definitely provides the 
means to do this.  It becomes a way for bosses to tell staff where they want the business 
to go.  For example, at Ford, which claims to have the world’s largest intranet, 170,000 
staff around the world are e-mail d a weekly “Let’s chat” note from Jack Nasser, the 
chief executive.  A newsroom maintains a website upgraded several times a day, and 
available to Ford’s employees around the world (in English only), as well as to those of 
its new acquisitions, such as Volvo.  Not only does the Internet allow managers to talk to 
their staff; it lets them track whether the staff are at least pretending to listen.  Will am 
Nuti, president of Europe, the Middle East and Africa for Cisco Systems, a high-tech 
giant, produces a monthly video to send to his staff, explaining where the business is 
going.  What happens if the staff does not choose to watch? Well, the Internet allows you 
to track who opens an e-mail and when. “I know everyone who clicks on it, and those 
who throw it away, and I make phone calls to people, saying it’s important you watch 
this103.” 
Another crucial issue, and arguably part of OAP8 (leadership), is the enforcement of 
corporate culture.  Many companies reckon the importance of getting people used to 
logging on as a quick way to get their people come to terms with changing business 
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methods104.  That is why Ford and some other companies, such as American Airlines, are 
giving their employees computers to use at home.  Two-thirds of Ford’s employees are 
hourly workers, who will not be able to use them to do company work from home.  But 
that is not the point.  Ford is hoping to get its entire people used to thinking online, and to 
have a direct way to reach them all with a consistent global message. 
3.3.2 The e-World highlights key Lean principles 
It is important to note the overlap between e-World principles and Lean principles.  The 
trust issue (e-W6), central to eBay’s business model, is nothing more than OAP6 
(“Develop relationships based on mutual trust and commitment”).  Likewise, “focus on 
end-customer” (e-W2), “identify and concentrate on your core competency” (e-W12), as 
well as “treat customers (users) as co-developers” (e-W7) are also common to the Lean 
principles.  e-W2 is similar to OAP7 (customer), e-W12 draws from OAP1 (Flow), and e-
W7 is arguably nothing more but an extension of OAP4 (make decisions at the lowest
level105). 
3.3.3 e-WiOAPj matrix 
The previous paragraphs have demonstrated how the e-W rld tr nds impact the Lean 
principles. The following table (Table 8) summarizes those results.  Reading from the left 
column to the right row, it represents how a given e-World principle e-Wi impacts the 
Lean principles OAPj.  The legend is the same as the legend previously used for the 
interaction matrix (Table 5).  Crosses are used to represent disruptive effects, either of 
one specific e-W on a specific OAP or on a whole column or row, meaning that a given 
OAP is disrupted by the whole Internet phenomenon.  Some of the interactions were 
                                         
104 As the Economist notes (e-management survey, November 2000): [one way to ensure that people will 
log on is to make material of direct interest to workers (say, their holiday entitlement) available online.  
Cisco Systems, keen to attract the attention of its option-owning employees, plonks its share price centre-
screen. Other companies post a list of employees with a birthday that week. Scient, an Internet consulting 
firm in San Francisco, has an area called “Do you want to scream at anyone?”, for employe s to complain 
about colleagues who send excessive e-ma ls. The site shows the daily winner in categories such as “Take a 
chill pill.”] 
105 Understanding the customer to be at the lowest level! 
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simply deduced from the existing interaction matrix (see T ble 5).  For example e-W6 
(trust) is very similar to OAP6 (relationship) and has a comparable impact on the OAPs 
as OAP6 has.  The “arrows” connecting two e-World or LEM principles indicates a 
strong correlation between the principles. 
Table 8: The e-World as an Enabler to Lean 
OAP1 OAP2 OAP3 OAP4 OAP5 OAP6 OAP7 OAP8 OAP9 OAP10 OAP11 OAP12
e-W1
Direct model
e-W2
Customer
e-W3
Supply Chain
e-W4
Stakeholders
e-W5
Community
e-W6
Trust
e-W7
Users=codev.
e-W8
Release early
e-W9
Anti-Brooks
e-W10
Standard
e-W11
Exchange
e-W12
Competency
LEGEND: Prerequisite Strong Impact Moderate Impact Limited Impact
Flow CapabilityProcessesCustomerIPPDPeople
Information Decisions Relationships Leadership Learning Requirement
Disruptive impact Strong correlation
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4 Lean as a prerequisite to the e-World 
The purpose of this section is to reverse our vantage point and examine how the Lean 
principles influence the e-World principles. 
4.1 General comments on the LEM 
Before starting in greater detail with the systematic analysis of the OAPs, we may want to 
ponder the concepts displayed in the OAPs of LEM. 
The Lean Enterprise Model is organized in three levels. At the top are the LEM
principles, which include the Meta principles and the Enterprise principles (see WebLEM 
at http://lean.mit.edu/). At the bottom of the LEM, we find the deepest level of 
information with the Overarching principles and their corresponding Enabling and 
supporting practices.  Between the two layers of information, a set of four enterprise level 
metrics is used.  As the next subsection will show, the graphical presentation of the 12 
overarching practices is somehow misguiding because it presents all the OAPs on the 
same level of importance.  However, besides this observation, there seems to be an 
intrinsic incongruity between OAP12 and the “Responsiveness to Change” Meta-
Principle.  As a matter of fact, OAP12 (Maximize stability in a changing environment) 
focuses on maintaining program stability, which seems essentially passive and static, 
whereas the responsiveness to change Meta principle is fundamentally dynamic.  Of 
course, OAP12 can be justified for the specific context of a military program where the 
budget constraint is a crucial parameter that one would prefer to keep stable.  But isn’t 
Lean also about responding to budget volatility?  Industries are all subject to change.  
Charles Fine, author of “Clockspeed” demonstrates how industry structures constantly 
evolve from Vertical/Integral to Horizontal/Modular and back on the double helix106.  
Professor Fine also claims the inevitable temporariness of all competitive advantage.  His 
                                         
106 Charles Fine, Clockspeed, 1998, 49 
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analysis supports a dynamic approach to the enterprise and questions the need for OAP12 
in the LEM. 
4.2 All OAPs are equal…some more than others 
Even though the LEM presents all OAP at the same level, the LEM interaction matrix 
(see Table 9) sets implicit priorities among the Lean principles.  The LEM interaction 
matrix, not surprisingly, exhibits the different level of interactions between the OAPs.  As 
explained in the legend of Table 9, the various impacts range from “Prerequisite” to 
“Limited Impact”.  Our analysis is based on the study of each dimension of the matrix.  
Read horizontally, it tells us how a given OAP impacts all the others.  For example OAP1 
(Flow) has a strong impact on OAP5 (IPPD) since it “provides identification of all steps 
in the product cycle to establish the stakeholders by function and timing of need to 
participate in IPTs107.”  To take that factor into account, a horizontal score was calculated 
for each OAP by adding horizontally its impact on other OAPs.  To keep the arithmetic 
simple, we adopted the following calculation method: “Prerequisite” counts for 3, 
“Strong Impact” for 2, “Moderate Impact” for 1 and “Limited Impact” for 0.  The 
horizontal score was labeled “Influence factor”.  For example, OAP10 (Learning) has 5 
“Moderate Impacts” and 1 “Strong Impact”, which, in the end, results into a horizontal 
score of 7.  The vertical score, by contrast, measures the level of independence of a given 
OAP.  Since OAP2 (Information) is a prerequisite to OAP5 (IPPD), one would rather 
focus first on OAP2 and then work on OAP5 than the other way around.  We are 
interested in independent OAPs, and to ensure that independent OAPs would score higher 
than dependent OAPs, we chose the opposite calculation method: 0 for “Prerequisite”, 1 
for “Strong Impact”, 2 for “Moderate Impact”, and 3 for “Limited Impact”.  The 
horizontal score was labeled “Independence Factor”.  For example, OAP11 (Capability) 
has 1 “Limited Impact”, 5 “Moderate Impacts”, 4 “Strong Impacts” and 1 “Prerequisite”, 
which gives it an independence factor of 17.  The sum of the Independence Factor and 
the Influence Factor gives the Overall Priority Factor. 
                                         
107 From the LEM tool online at lean.mit.edu 
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This simple calculation leads to the following conclusion: there are clear levels of priority 
among the OAPs.  Not surprisingly, OAP8 (leadership) appears to be the OAP that 
should be treated as very first priority.  It is not new that human capital plays such an 
important role in the success of an enterprise: OAP8 is exactly about employees get ing 
involved in their work and promoting lean practices.  Other OAPs that appear at a high 
level of priority include: OAP2 (Information), OAP3 (People), OAP4 (Decisions), OAP6 
(Trust) and OAP7 (Customer).  The notion of priority as we define it among OAPs 
however should not be confused with the respective level of importance of each OAP.  
For example, the very low score of OAP1 (Flow) does not mean that identifying and 
optimizing enterprise flow is less important than OAP8.  What the interaction matrix tells 
us rather, is that OAP2 (seamless information flow) should precede OAP1 (Flow).  
Extended to the twelve overarching practices, this analysis reinforces the need for a 
timely approach of the Lean principles. 
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Table 9: All OAPs are not equal 
4.3 The Lean “core” principles are principles of the e-World 
In this subsection, the OAPs and their impact on the e-W rld principles are examined in 
more details.  The same systematic OAP by OAP approach as the one we adopted for the 
e-World trends would be lengthy, tedious, partly redundant with what was already 
discussed in 3.2 of this chapter, and, last but not least, completely ineffectual.  Also, after 
the two previous subsections, emphasis will be placed on a subset of the OAPs, namely 
the OAPs which, as we saw in the preceding section, should be prioritized in any 
implementation of a lean strategy: OAP2 (Information), OAP3 (People), OAP4 
HORIZONTAL
OAP1 OAP2 OAP3 OAP4 OAP5 OAP6 OAP7 OAP8 OAP9 OAP10 OAP11 OAP12 SCORE:
Flow 1 10
Information 2 17
People 3 13
Decisions 4 15
IPPD 5 14
Relationships 6 19
Customer 7 13
Leadership 8 32
Processes 9 10
Learning 10 7
Capability 11 11
Requirement 12 2
LEGEND: Prerequisite Strong Impact Moderate Impact Limited Impact
VERTICAL
SCORE: 12 17 24 19 12 21 23 24 18 22 17 24 Independence Factor
REPORTED
HORIZONTAL
SCORE:
10 17 13 15 14 19 13 32 10 7 11 2 Influence Factor
TOTAL
SCORE: 22 34 37 34 26 40 36 56 28 29 28 26 Overall Priority Factor
OAP INTERACTION MATRIX
Flow CapabilityProcessesCustomerIPPDPeople
Information Decisions Relationships Leadership Learning Requirement
NUMBER ONE PRIORITY OAPs
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(Decision), OAP6 (Relationship), OAP7 (Customer), and, most important, OAP8 
(Leadership). 
4.3.1 Lean is a key element of Dell’s competitive advantage
In the fast developing PC industry, component obsolescence is a constant obsession for 
the supply chain manager.  The more inventory in the chain, the higher the obsolescence
costs.  As Professor Fine explains, “the faster the clockspeed, the higher the obsolescence 
costs. So whoever has the leanest chains wins – and the faster the clockspeed, the larger 
the margin of victory.  No wonder Michael Dell is printing money108.”  What is lean 
about Dell that enables them to keep their competitive advantage? Why can’t Compaq, 
IBM and HP just copy Dell’s model? After all Dell does not own any proprietary patent 
on its direct sales model.  In fact Dell started Lean from its very first day of operation 
whereas its competitors are all dependent on their current channel resellers for sales.  As 
Professor Fine explains, “any attempt to eliminate those resellers is likely to cause sales 
to plummet until the new model is fully worked out. Meanwhile, those lost sales will go 
to Dell Computer Corporation or another competitor and may not come back.  Thus the 
resellers/channel-d pendent producers are forced to adopt a gradual conversion rather 
than go cold turkey, so to speak.  But a gradual conversion in a fast clockspeed industry 
can seem like a lifetime.  As a result, Dell Computer remains in the driver’s seat – for 
now108.” 
As this example clearly shows, lean (here a mix of OAP1 (flow), OAP2 (information), 
OAP5 (IPPD) and OAP7 (customer)) from the beginning is a key advantage of Dell’s 
model and a reason why competitors cannot just copy the Dell recipe and reap the 
benefits of the market. 
                                         
108 Charles Fine, Clockspeed, 1998, 74. 
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4.3.2 OAP2 contrasts with e-W5 (community effects) 
Isn’t the Internet, by definition, about seamless information flows?  Section 3 highlighted 
the overlap between OAP1 (Identify and optimize enterprise flow) and Enron’s e-W12 
(Identify and concentrate on your core competency).  Once this huge part of the job is 
done, aren’t Internet tools going to provide the seamless information flow required 
throughout the whole enterprise?  The answer is “yes and no” and creates the whole 
complexity of e-World principles. 
We have already argued that the e-World principles support OAP4 (decisions at the 
lowest level) and showed that in fact, the most disruptive e-World trends appeared to be 
Linux’s e-W7 (users=codevelopers) combined with eBay’s e-W5 (community effects).  
Here we just want to reverse our viewpoint and underline that the disruptive effect is 
indeed symmetrical.  OAP2 (information) is described as “Provide processes for seamless 
and timely transfer of and access to pertinent information.”  With a goal such as OAP2, it 
is difficult to imagine trying to leverage community effects in a similar way as what eBay 
is doing109, which is why we conclude that OAP2 stands against e-W5. 
4.3.3 Leadership is a prerequisite to the e-World
Not directly an overarching principle, leadership (more broadly speaking that just lean 
leadership) is a crucial firststep to implementing any e-World strategy.  As usual a sheer 
scale of change is impossible without determined leadership.  Is it like the electricity 
revolution? A generational problem? A survey conducted in early 2000 by the National 
Association of Manufacturers found that more than two- irds of American 
manufacturers did not use the Internet for business-to- i  commerce. “Whenever I 
visit software companies,” says Andrew McAfee, a professor at Harvard Business 
School, “I get them to complete the sentence, ‘The business-to-busines  revolution is x% 
                                         
109eBay’s principle is to allow any kind of information exchange to reinforce community bonds between 
users.  This is obviously not the focus of OAP2. 
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complete.’ The biggest number I have heard is 5%. Many say 1%.110”  Those comments 
might seem trivial but implementing an e-busi ess strategy will not succeed without 
strong leadership.  This example is one that adds to the list underlining the staggering 
importance of OAP8 (leadership). 
4.3.4 OAPie-Wj matrix 
The previous paragraphs have demonstrated how the Lean principles impact the e-World 
trends. Table 10 summarizes those results.  The same legend was used as for the e-
WiOAPj matrix.  For example, we saw that OAP5 (IPPD) had a strong impact on e-W3 
(Supply Chain) and, arguably, it impacts e-W2-4-6 and 10 while it is inconsistent with e-
W5 (Community effects).  Also we argued about the ambiguity of OAP12 and show how 
we might want to eliminate it from the LEM principles. 
                                         
110 The Economist, E-Management Survey, November 2000 
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Table 10: Lean as a prerequisite to the e-World 
5 Summary 
This chapter first in roduced the e-World principles and then studied their interaction 
with the Lean practices.  Unsurprisingly, the e-World principles have a lot of 
characteristics in common with the Lean principles.  The notion of Trust is in both cases 
central and primordial to the success of the enterprise.  Some very successful Internet 
companies, such as Dell, have business models integrally tied to Lean principles.  Less 
expected however were some disruptive effects from the e-W rld.  The notion of 
e-W1 e-W2 e-W3 e-W4 e-W5 e-W6 e-W7 e-W8 e-W9 e-W10 e-W11 e-W12
OAP1
Flow
OAP2
Information
OAP3
People
OAP4
Decisions
OAP5
IPPD
OAP6
Relationships
OAP7
Customers
OAP8
Leadership
OAP9
Processes
OAP10
Learning
OAP11
Capability
OAP12
Requirement
LEGEND: Prerequisite Strong Impact Moderate Impact Limited Impact
Direct Model ExchangeAnti-BrooksUsers=codev.CommunitySupply Chain
Customer Stakeholders Trust Release early Standard Competency
Destructive impact Strong correlation
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“disintermediation” illustrated by Dell’s Direct Business Model was certainly familiar to 
fans of consulting publications but Linux’s challenge to the law of diminishing returns 
for production functions and eBay’s success built on community bonds are much less 
commonly described in business papers. 
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CHAPTER 5: RECOMMENDATIONS & 
POLICY ISSUES  
1 A cautionary tale for e-business skeptics: The demise of 
Encyclopedia Britannica111 
Skepticism when it does not lead to exaggerated conservatism is often a healthy 
detachment that enables objectivity.  Total skepticism vis-à-vis the mass mediatized 
“New Economy” revolution is singular but can be a challenging intellectual exercise.  
Against the totally sceptical the following story is a regularly cited cautionary tale.  There 
are obviously dozens of similar stories but this one is particularly appealing to anyone 
who was born at a time when books existed. 
The notion of an encyclopedia was essentially a product of the Enlightenment.  In France, 
Denis Diderot devoted a lifetime to producing one.  But what was to become the most 
famous encyclopedia in the world started life in 1768, in Edinburgh, Scotland: the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica.  As it went through successive editions, academics and 
ordinary readers alike came to rely on it; even today, some historians b come misty-eyed 
when they talk of the great 11th edition, published in 1911.  
The reputation of Encyclopaedia Britannica survived a change of ownership in 1920 to 
Sears Roebuck, an upstart mail-order retailer, and a move of its base to Chicago.  Two 
                                         
111 as it is for example in Evans and Wurster’s Blown to bits. The following case study is based on their 
book’s first chapter. 
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decades later it became the property of a foundation, the proceeds of which benefited the 
University of Chicago.  Its door-to-door salesmen became legendary for their knack of 
persuading parents that an encyclopedia was a must if their children were to grow up ll 
educated.  By 1989, sales revenues had reached a record $650m, and the firm’s sales 
force had grown to 2,300. 
Yet disaster was already waiting in the wings.  It began when Microsoft produced a cheap 
CD-ROM encyclopedia called Encarta in 1993.  Britannica’s bosses responded with a 
CD-ROM of their own, but their salesmen rebelled at seeing their hardcover books 
undercut112.  The Internet made things infinitely worse.  Sales collapsed, along with the 
sales force.  In 1995 the company changed hands again, for a small fraction of its book 
value.  Today it employs fewer than 350 people.  In October 1999 the new owner decided 
to make the contents of Encyclopaedia Britannica available free on the Internet, in the 
optimistic hope of recouping the cost through advertising on the website.  But, as if to 
question even this new strategy, the site promptly crashed. 
2 Introduction 
Any subject that is even by far related to Internet technologies carries with it a plethora of 
policy issues that regulators and industry leaders have to deal with.
The mere notion of private property raises huge questions: “How should policy handle 
digital property rights, e.g., through contract versus copyright?”, “How can we strike the 
proper balance between privacy, censorship and security (national and commercial) in the 
electronic economy?”.  Mention fair access to information and you need to ask: “What 
rules should govern network access and interoperability?” or “How should issues of 
equity and universal service be handled?”.  Add to that an international dimension and 
the whole pictures blurs into an inextricable gridlock: “What must be decided 
                                         
112 Other versions of the story stipulate that they never believed that a mere CD would ever overtake their 
noble books share of the market. 
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internationally to allow national policies to be effective?”, “How can one reconcile 
differences among national regulatory regimes (e.g., in standards- etting processes or 
privacy laws)?”, “What will be the consequences of the contrast between the American 
preference for markets and the European and Asian desire to use government 
intervention?”. 
All these questions are fundamental for decision maker  to be r in mind.  The ambition of 
this chapter however is different.  First the lessons that can be learned from the four case 
studies of CHAPTER 2 are discussed.  Second this chapter examines the deep changs in 
organization of industries due to the Internet.  Third and most important we turn our 
attention towards ourselves and examine the impact of the e-World on people, i.e. human 
resources. 
3 Lessons from the “fruitflies113” 
3.1 Customer focus 
[Baseline: Should companies use customer focus to price discriminate? Yes, but there are 
technological constraints and the customer itself can be difficult to identify and define in 
a collaborative IT enabled environment] 
Dell’s case study has demonstrated how customer focus is central to Dell’s business 
model.  One obvious way companies could use their customer knowledge is to offer 
different customers different prices and levels of service.  So far, most have hesitated to 
do so - or at least have hidden their attempts more carefully than did Amazon.com, which 
was savaged in early 2000 for quoting different prices for the same book114. But clearly, 
the true promise of customer data is to help companies to discriminate, in service quality 
                                         
113 Expression borrowed from Charles Fine’s Clockspeed – Winning Industry Control in the Age of 
Temporary Advantage, Perseus Books, 1998. 
114 Smith and Brynjolfsson, The Great Equalizer, Consumer Choice at Internet Shopbots, MIT, July 2000 
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and perhaps in price, and to target thei  services so that they give priority to their most 
profitable customers. 
There are both technological and cultural limits however to the possibilities of applying 
customer focus a la Dell to any other industry.  For telecommunications companies, for 
example, customer relationship management and customer value management try to 
create useful knowledge out of enormous databases of customer usage habits and 
preferences, which rapidly becomes an extremely complex problem.  In addition, it 
becomes less and less obvious to locate one’s customers.  As companies link their 
databases together, and try to cross-sell products to a customer who sees a single 
common front, they run up against a new version of an ancient problem: how to motivate 
one salesman in a company to hand over a customer to another.  Without incentives to 
share customers, the most elegantly reconciled data in the world will make no difference.  
As Forrester notes: “In most companies, the tyranny of the distribution channel will make 
customer-sharing a hard problem”.  “In large companies,” observes George Colony, chief 
executive of Forrester Research, “tremendous political power has built up around these 
channels.  It takes the CEO to force the breakdown of the walls.” 
3.2 Value chain integration 
[Baseline: 1) The major challenges to value chain integration are technology and trust.  
2) Value integrators for aerospace industry (e.g. Exostar) are under scrutiny for anti-
collusion] 
Value chain integration is another key element of the Dell model that was discussed in 
CHAPTER 1.  At Dell Corporation, the Internet (dellonline) enables suppliers to access 
information on customer demand in real time and allows a virtual collaboration between 
Dell and its suppliers-partners.  The success of Dell making PCs to order has led 
executives from traditional manufacturing giants, such General Motors or Maytag, to 
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make pilgrimages to Austin, Texas to learn the Dell way115.  For an exchange like 
Exostar however, integrating 37,000suppliers faces many challenges.   
It is first of all a technological challenge.  As mentioned in CHAPTER 3, Lockheed 
Martin was planning on starting virtual supplier collaboration in March 2001.  Today 
(Spring 2001), Exostar is only able to accommodate the trade of direct material116 and it 
is only in February 2001 that Exostar partnered with PTC to deliver global collaborative 
product design and commerce services117. 
Second, the issue of trust, which appeared so fundamental both in the e-World and Lean 
principles, constitutes another major challenge for B2B exchanges.  Professor Hau Lee 
from Stanford University has conducted substancial research on the subject.  Incentives 
for partners to second-guess each other are high as some may face the prisoner’s 
dilemma118. 
Third, for the special case of military programs (e.g. defense weapons), the notion of 
inventory has a definitely different dimension.  Even the slightest probability of a war 
breakout will probably never lead any country’s defense department to build its weapons 
to order without keeping any part in reserve.  Related to the military dimension is also the 
necessarily highly integrated architecture of some products.  As discussed in CHAPTER 
4, because of high performance requirements and extreme product complexity, it is very 
difficult, if not completely impossible, to allow the same level of modularity in PCs for 
commercial or military aircrafts.  Nevertheless, one could certainly recommend military 
                                         
115 The Economist, April 14 2001, 63 
116 EC Technology News, January 5 2001 
117 Canada News Wire, February 26 2001, announced that spareparts would be traded on the Exostar 
exchange in Spring 2001 by incorporating Boeing’s Part Analysis and Requirement Tracking (PART) 
system to Exostar. 
118 The prisoner’s dilemma is an often-used concept in game theory.  Two prisoners are questioned 
separately about a crime they committed. Each may give evidence against the other or may say nothing.  If 
both say nothing, they get a minor reprimand and go free because of lack of evidence.  If one gives 
evidence and the other says nothing, the first goes free and the second is severely punished.  If both give 
evidence, both are severely punished.  The overall (globally) best strategy isfor bo h o say nothing.  
However not knowing (or trusting) what the other will do, each prisoner's (locally) best strategy is to give 
evidence, which is the worst possible outcome.  
In general, a situation where local optimization is used leads to the worst possibl  outcome globally. 
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industry leaders to catch up as much as possible with modularity in software controls to 
benefit from hardware innovations. 
Finally Exostar, as an enabler to design, development, and production collaboration 
between until now competing companies, will certainly be much more subject to 
regulatory offices scrutiny than dellonline will be.  In fact, its automobile industry 
equivalent, Covisint was challenged in its early days by anti-trust authorities both in 
Europe and the United States.  For anti-collusion authorities key questions include: “For 
what issues is an ad-hoc response appropriate to the regulatory challenges posed by the 
internet and E-commerce?”, “For which issues would it be best to permit commercial 
practice to be slowly codified as it evolves?”, “Under what circumstances do we want to 
act more proactively?”.  The list is long.
3.3 eBay’s Dynamic Pricing and Enron’s exchange model 
[Baseline: 1) Dynamic pricing faces challenges to adapt to other industries: product 
complexity and demand-supply mismatch. 2) Once more: it appears fundamental for a 
company to identify its core competency] 
The eBay and Enron models raise the question of pricing structure on an exchange.  
Dynamic pricing is a success among eBay and Enron’s users but does that mean that the 
price of any item can be negotiated? 
Again, product complexity rises as one of the most obvious hurdles against this e-World 
trend.  As previously discussed, Exostar enables the trade of both indirect (e.g. 
consumables and piece parts such as nuts and bolts, commodity and commercial, off-the 
shelf items with part number and catalog reference) and direct products (e.g. black box 
components with proprietary technology such as radars).  It is very questionable whether 
companies will ever be willing to trade complex built-to-specification subsystems, or 
even more challenging, jointly designed systems, completely virtually119.  In addition to 
                                         
119 I am thankful to Dr. Bozdogan for providing me the scale of product complexities 
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the complexity of the product the allocation problem also arises.  Very often buyers ask 
for a set of items that none of the sellers exactly offers.  FreeMarkets, the industry 
equivalent of eBay, already offers its services to help match a buyer’s demand with a 
seller’s supply.  Yet again, one can question how such a system could apply to one-time 
jointly designed and highly integrated products.
As Tapscott notes, dynamic pricing in an auction mode “tends to prevail where the 
transaction costs of negotiating are lower than the range of uncertainty about the final 
price120.”  If the value of a good is uncertain, or the purchaser is flexible within a 
category, or the contract is big enough, then a variable-pricing opportunity certainly 
exists.  Will that lead any business that conducts large-scale selling or buying to 
eventually use variable pricing?  This is an open question to the next generation. 
Besides dynamic pricing, one of the main trends highlighted by Enron’s case study is the 
extreme necessity for a company to identify its core competency.  This is no new rule for 
managers, but in the era of Internet speed, the rule has become a number one priority.  
For skeptical managers, the story of Encyclopedia Britannica is a must-read.  Enron 
proved to be very skilled at identifying and concentrating on its core competency: 
delivering power.  In fact, Enron is the company that understood faster than the rest of the 
industry that power should be traded like financial instruments are traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange. 
3.4 Lessons from the Linux phenomenon 
3.4.1 Getting people to work for free? 
[Baseline: Getting people to work for free is every manager’s dream – a couple 
recommendation to foster Linux-like innovations] 
                                         
120 Tapscott, Digital Capital – Harnessing the Power of Business Webs, HBS Press, 2000, 40.
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Caricaturing the Linux phenomenon to the extreme, it is easy to reject the whole 
phenomenon.  Who would ever work for free in this world? 
To add to this pessimism, an empirical study from Von Hippel and Lakhani 121 shows that 
the need to call upon any of the traditional explanations122 to clarify the Linux 
phenomenon exists only for a small portion of information providers.  According to their 
study, most contributors provide others with their help because it increases their own 
knowledge.  Whether one rejects the philanthropy of Linux software programmers or not, 
companies would certainly benefit from inspiring the sort of altruism that has gone into 
developing open-source software. 
In some ways, corporate innovation increasingly resembles Linux code writing.  The 
teams that work on it are often geographically dispersed.  And as discussed earlier, design 
is increasingly modular rather than sequential: people no longer design the engine and 
then pass it on to a second group to produce the casing, which discovers problems with 
the engine design just as the first team has moved on to its next project.  Besides, 
innovation is increasingly delivered not by a single company’s research-and-development 
department, but by a network of companies, each working on a different part of the 
project. 
However, unlike Mr Torvalds123, it seems that traditional companies still need to rely on 
their employees’ ideas for making their money.  IBM has a scheme to make sure that 
good ideas bring more than a pat on the back.  Developing a patent wins a financial 
reward; so does authorship of a certain number of articles; and consultants get bonuses 
for creating and sharing good ideas. The company is also working on a way to encourage 
people to put their ideas into its knowledge database, by rewarding those who create 
                                         
121 How Open Source software works:“Free” user-to-user assistance, Karim Lakhani and Eric von Hippel, 
May, 2000. Note: Lakhani and von Hippel studied the case of Apache 
122i.e. altruism; incentives to support one’s community; reputation-enhanceme t benefits received by 
information providers; and expectations of benefits from reciprocal helping behavior by others 
123 Linus Torvalds, a 22 year old Finnish University student in 1991, initiated the Linux phenomenon when 
he released his Linux code for free on Usenet, the Internet’s global information-sharing resource at the 
time. 
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material that is frequently used, as well as those who review or grade the stored ideas in 
particularly helpful ways124. 
3.4.2 Adapting pricing structure to changing products
[Baseline: in the e-World, information is free and products can no longer be priced on 
their sale value. It is recommendable for companies to rethink their pricing structure] 
Besides its highly debated altruistic nature, the Linux phenomenon highlights the 
changing nature of the value of products.  As more and more products rely heavily on 
electronic components and software controls, the whole notion of product value needs to 
be re-examined. 
Since software are pure information products that can be reproduced at zero costs thanks 
to modern information technology, many have argued that their price will eventually be 
zero too, with suppliers condemned to undercut each other’s prices.  Following that 
reasoning, any information product will also eventually be sold at a zero price and the 
author’s thesis advisor will simply download her new BMW’s operating system on a 
freeware website by pressing a button on the steering wheel.  BMW will thus stop 
producing those products and we will soon drive our grandparent’s automobiles again…a 
plausible scenario isn’t it? 
Eric Raymond, a strong advocate of the open-source movement, stresses the difference 
between the sale value and the use value of software products.  The sale value is usually 
defined by the cost of producing the software in terms of programmer’s work hours.  
More and more however, software product innovation speed is increasing so fast, most of 
the value of software products comes from the customer service (or help desk).  Eric 
Raymond argues that companies should change their pricing structure to take that factor 
into account.  “They just will not afford their current pricing structure125.” 
                                         
124 The Economist, E-Management Survey, November 2000 
125 Eric Raymond, The Magic Cauldron – 3. The Manufacturing Delusion (available on his website) 
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Consequently, traditional manufacturers should examine their pricing structure.  As a 
result of an increased usage of IT in many physical products, more and more companies 
will define themselves as service, rather than product, providers and their pricing 
schedule will inevitably need to adapt. 
4 Organizational changes 
4.1 The end of hierarchy? Political tensions ahead… 
4.1.1 Introduction 
[Baseline: Until now information access has created hierarchy. With the end of 
hierarchy, isn’t a company’s core competency to just organize the supply chain?] 
Limited and inequitable information access traditionally creates two types of hierarchies: 
hierarchy of choice and hierarchy of power126.  
Hierarchy of choice can be illustrated by the decision tree along which customers are 
compelled to do their shopping in the physical world: they must choose a street, t en a
shop, then a department, then a shelf, then a product.  Hierarchy of power is illustrated by 
the traditional organization chart, in which senior executives have a wider span of 
knowledge than their subordinates (Figure13). 
                                         
126 Evans and Wurster, St ategy and the New Economics of Information, Harvard Business Review, 
September-October 1997, 75 
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Figure 13: Hierarchical Decision Tree (left) and Hierchical Organization (right) 
As Evans and Wurster note, the alternative to hierarchy is markets, which are 
symmetrical and open to the extent that they are perfect.  But t aditional markets trade 
only in less rich information.  When the trade-off between richness and reach is 
eliminated, everyone communicates richly with everyone else on the basis of shared 
standards.  Evans and Wurster name this phenomenon “hyperarchy” after the hyperlinks 
of the World Wide Web (Figure 14) 
Figure 14: Hyperarchy 
If there is a possibility that far richer information can be exchanged than that involved in 
trading products and certificates of ownership, then hyperarchy may challenge all 
markets.  It may also enable us to answer more fundamental questions of corporate 
organizations and identity. 
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Examining visually the fading of the reach/richness tradeoff with a hypothetical four- 
company enterprise leads to questioning the definition of a company (Figure 15).  With a 
highly modular enterprise architecture built on top of functional teams, it seems that the 
notion of corporate boundaries disappears.  Does that mean that the glue that holds a 
company together is its ability to organize teams, to assemble and disassemble them 
(which incidentally is Dell’s core competency)127? 
Figure 15: The End of the Hierachical Organization? 
4.1.2 Political tensions 
[Baseline: the democratizing effect of the Internet faces cultural barriers. Top 
management seems to be willing to keep its power] 
As compelling as this theory of hierarchies’s demise might be, the “democratization” 
effect of the Internet still faces heavy political and cultural barriers. 
SAP, a German business-software giant, has a very elaborate communications system 
that makes it resemble the previous hyperarchy (Figure 14).  It allows material to be 
broadcast on the car radios of workers on the road, for example.  The company found that 
middle managers objected to the chairman e-mailing all employees.  Their authority had 
                                         
127 Note that Charles Fine comes to the same conclusion in Clockspeed: companies’s ultimate core 
competency is to organize the supply chain 
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rested partly on their role as a source of information, and w thout it they felt exposed.  As 
so often with Internet-driven changes, the implications of what appeared to be a simple, 
time-saving innovation turned out to be more complex and politically sensitive.  That 
sensitivity becomes more acute as communi ations become increasingly bottom-up as 
well as top-down.  At Siemens, a large German company, Chittur Ramakrishnan, the 
chief information officer, has noticed a “very significant number of e-mails to top 
management.  The idea of going through a secretary to get an appointment has changed. 
People can send e-mails to anyone and expect a response. It is very democratising.”  
Knowing the extreme diplomacy of the CEO of a German company, one can better 
understand the highly disruptive effect of the Internet on the traditional organization128. 
4.2 The empowerment of the young? 
[Baseline: Internet is the youth’s first technology revolution. 1) Dramatic changes in 
training across the whole enterprise are needed. 2) There is also a need to rethink the 
value added by each rung of the hierarchical chart] 
4.2.1 Reversing training programs 
Big, traditional companies, from Procter & Gamble to Siemens, have started “reverse 
mentoring” programs in which middle-age  xecutives are tutored on the mysteries of the 
Internet by young newcomers who sometimes slip and call them “dude”.  General 
Electric’s CEO, Jack Welch, says “e-business knowledge is generally inversely 
proportional to both age and rank in the organization.”  GE asked its top 1,000 managers 
to become “mentee” to 1,000 young employees, many of whom had only recently joined 
the firm but who nevertheless understood the new technologies better than GE’s finest129. 
At the same time, the growth of start-up  nd young companies outside the mainstream 
corporate world is giving young people far more opportunity than ever before. About 
                                         
128 The Economist, E-Management Survey, November 2000 
129 The Economist , The Young Survey, December 2000 
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15% of American top managers (chief executives, presidents and company owners) are in 
their 20s or 30s, according to Dun & Bradstreet, a business-information provider. That 
would have been unthinkable a decade ago129.  In a world where the World Wide Web 
becomes the preferred way to communicate, one might recommend strategies to extend 
all staff development and training programs (as well as recruiting) across the entire 
extended enterprise. 
4.2.2 The upside-down enterprise 
The Internet craze has seen an increasing number of young people mastering new 
technologies and landing at the CEO level in the mid 20s or 30s.  Does that mean there 
will be a wholesale takeover by the young? A good place to look for an answer is 
Microsoft, which has had a quarter-cen u y’s experience with the workforce trends that 
most companies are only just beginning to confront128.  
Microsoft’s most important employees are not its managers, but its individual 
programmers (the lowest rung on the organizational chart), who take the company’s only 
real lasting asset, its knowledge, home with them in their heads each night.  They have 
great autonomy in choosing how to do their job.  By and large, the managers’ task is not 
to tell the programmers what to do, but to clear obstacles from the path they choose.   
This is the military model turned upside down: the officers serving the enlisted men.  The 
difference is that whereas the best soldiers do not question orders, knowledge workers are 
valued most for their ability to think for themselves.  They are trusted to steer their own 
path through business problems.  Managers hold back, knowing that the more specific 
their order, the more it is likely to undermine their employees’ ability to find creative 
solutions.  So they concentrate on the diplomatic tasks that most of the independent 
young programmers are not much good at: co-ordinating with other teams, resolving 
conflicts, motivating people and ensuring that everybody is happy. 
Thinking of the programmers as young workers and the managers as older ones looks like 
a model for the workplace of the future.  As it happens, Microsoft’s programmers tend to 
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be in their 20s and early 30s, whereas the managers are about a decade older.  Many of 
the managers are former programmers who reached a point where they no longer wanted 
to sleep under their desk.  The effect of all this is that youth and youth qualities 
apparently dominate, but the experience and maturity of older employees is put to good 
use too. 
5 People Implications 
5.1 Reward structure 
[Baseline: Internet age people want to be more involved in their work.  How should a 
company reward them accordingly?] 
It has been argued that the Internet modifies the involvement of people in their work.  On 
one hand, the new generation born with the first computers, has been observed by 
Tapscott in his book “Growing up Digital” and shown to be more entrepreneurial than 
their parents130, being brought up with online games fostering their creativity.  This point 
is certainly very debatable, but the increasing number of employees investing in stock is 
another reason to predict strong desire of people for more performance-bas d rewards to 
be involved in the profits of their companies131. 
Pay structures should also be adapted to foster collaborative work, designed to reward 
team workers rather than lone rangers.  As illustrated by the Linux examples, the motives 
that persuade people to work together are not exclusively financial.  In the Linux model, 
thousands of people around the world who have never met work together, unpaid.  The 
model requires a workable kernel (in this case, the initial 10,000 lines of codes written by 
Linus Torvalds) to which people can easily add, a modular design, so that different 
                                         
130 Don Tapscott, Growing up Digital,  
131 The Economist, The Young Survey and E-Management Survey, November-Dec mber 2000 
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people need to understand only the part they choose to work on, and a small team at the 
top to set broad guidelines and select the best ideas.  Their reward is global recognition. 
5.2 Size and definition of companies  (boundaries?)– e-Lancers 
5.2.1 Decreasing size of firms 
[Baseline: Theory and empirical studies demonstrate decreasing size of companies in IT 
world] 
Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase is often cited for his study on the nature of the firm.  
According to his theory132, transactions costs should be blamed to explain why each 
individual worker does not work independently to sell the result of her work to other 
workers.  Since the Internet’s most obvious consequence is its huge reduction of 
transaction costs, it is tempting to infer that the size of companies should decrease. 
As a matter of fact, an empirical study conducted by MIT faculty in 1997133 finds broad 
evidence that investment in IT is significantly associated with subsequent decreases in th 
average size of firms. This same study also finds that the effects of IT on organizations 
are most pronounced after a lag of two to three years and although the correlations it 
finds does not necessarily imply causality, they are consistent with the theory that IT 
makes market-based coordination more attractive relative to internal coordination. 
5.2.2 E-lancing 
[Baseline: the end of the integrated firm? The rise of e-lancing] 
In one extreme view, Thomas Malone and Robert Laubacher argue that a in a couple of 
decades, we may look back on the integrated firm as a transitional structure that 
flourished for a brief moment in history.  They suggest in an argumentation similar to 
                                         
132 Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm”, 1937 (first publication) 
133, Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani and Kambil, An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between 
Information Technology and Firm Size, MIT, January 1993 
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Alberthal’s global virtual village theory that the fundamental unit of the economy may be
reverting from the corporation to the individual.  Independent contractors, rather than 
full-time employees in big companies, will perform most work and “such networked e-
lancers will join fluid and temporary webs to design, produce, market, and support goods 
and services134.” Indeed, Tapscott mentions that thousands of individual free agents 
auctioned their services on Talent Market at Monster.com in 1999 and that on eBay, an 
entire virtual project team put itself up for sale135. 
In yet other signs of change, Prudential, a large insurance company, recently altered its 
slogan from “Get a piece of the rock” to “Be your own rock”.  Margaret Reagan, a 
consultant with Towers Perrin, which studies workforce trends, predicts that barely one-
third of the millennials wi l take steady staff jobs with companies.  Instead most will 
freelance, work under contract, or part-time136. 
5.3 Enterprise culture issue 
[Baseline: Home working raises important questions such as how to define enterprise 
culture, rules and foster innovation] 
In a stable, slow-growing and well- stablished company, a common culture may be easy 
to maintain. You take each year’s new recruits off to boot camp for a fortnight and teach 
them the company history. But few companies today can afford to be stable or slow 
growing.  Instability and speed make culture-crea ion harder. 
In Silicon Valley, people count as old stagers if they have been with the same employer 
for much over a year.  But rapid turnover is not the only difficulty.  In many companies, 
the sales force or the maintenance folk rarely come into the office.  A quarter of IBM’s 
workforce, for instance, is now mobile - they spend at least 80% of their time off-site, 
                                         
134 Thomas Malone and Robert Laubacher, The Dawn of the E-Lance Economy, Harvard Business Review 
76, no. 5 (1998), 144. 
135 Don Tapscott, Digital Capital – Harnessing the Power of Business Webs, HBS Press 2000, 172. 
Tapscott also precises that the auction was never completed and the team withdrew. 
136 The Economist, The Young Survey, December 2000 
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usually working from home or on the road.  Key people may be based in key markets 
abroad, a day’s air travel away from the main office.  Mobility goes right to the top: 
Douglas Daft, chief executive of Coca-Cola, travels 80% of the time.  He boasts: “The 
headquarters office is where I am137.” 
Arguably, companies do not control their culture anymore.  With employees spending 
part of their days on another firm’s website, companies tend to lose their identities.  
However at the same time, it seems that the extended enterprise needs that intangible 
something to keep its cohesion.  Michael Dell for example spends a substantial amount of 
time telling the direct sales story as a way to invigorate a culture across the entire 
extended Dell enterprise in order to strengthen its (virtual) integration. 
Several issues arise from increased staff mobility138 and fading enterprise culture.  During 
his job interviews, the author of this thesis was told by a couple investment banks the 
importance of keeping their staff together to insure a high rate of product innovation.  If 
this rule holds for other companies, they should definitely ponder the pros and cons of 
allowing home working.  In one extreme view, current enterprise work rules also become 
totally obsolete if employees work from home.  In contexts such as product innovation 
and enterprise culture management where human interactions are so crucial, it would be 
interesting to see if the e-World will foster other mechanisms to substitute for 
geographical proximity.  As mentioned in CHAPTER 4, Jack Nasser e-mails a “Let’s 
chat” note to Ford’s 170,000 employees weekly and William Nuti, president of Europe, 
the Middle East and Africa fo Cisco Systems produces a monthly video to send to his 
staff, explaining where the business is going.  Is this tomorrow’s substitute for human 
interactions? 
                                         
137 The Economist, E-Management Survey, November 2000 
138This point is still controversial. Cutter Consortium (www.cutter.com) recently showed (Apr 06 2001) 
that workers telecommute on a limited basis. “Most Fortune 1000 companies allow telecommuting but very 
few employees work from home, and even fewer do so on a full-time basis” 
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5.4 HR 
[Baseline: To capture HR savings, there is a necessity to standardize HR rules 
throughout the whole enterprise, globally] 
The impact of the Internet on HR departments is already clearly visible in many 
industries.  Typically, HR departments us d to spend much of their time answering 
questions from employees: choice of various permutations of pension, health plan, 
holidays, pay, etc. Such questions are often more easily answered by a computer than a 
human being.  This has encouraged companies to put their employees’ details on a 
website, protected by a password, and allow their staff to update their personal 
information or, in refined versions, to experiment with different combinations of their 
compensation options.  The results can be dramatic. Even when staff could use the HR 
website only to update their records, Ford found that calls to the central help desk fell by 
80%139. 
Once they realize how much of HR can be shifted online, some companies might start to 
think about completely outsourcing the r HR department.  BP agreed in December last 
year to outsource much of its HR work to Exult, a start-up tha  has recently negotiated a 
second deal with Unisys, a computer giant.  One effect of handing over this project to 
Exult has been to reduce unnecessary diversity in compensation schedules, pension and 
insurance plans.  Once again, the impact of the Internet is to encourage simplicity and 
centralization. 
Should that lead companies to extend their HR (like their training programs) to the 
extended entrprise?  Aligning compensation schedules across the whole Exostar 
community might prove complicated.  This point of view is supported by Tapscott 
however, who defines Interenterprise Human Resource Management140 s the next step 
for traditional HR management.  Tapscott also suggests a need to understand human 
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140 Digital capital CHECK DETAILS… 
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resources as assets rather than liabilities (who would rather be a liability than an asset?).  
Could the traditional enormous HR department even become a profit center?  In the era 
of immediate communication, one could imagine an “Accenture-like” HR service, 
providing companies with professional teams when needed.  However, this extreme view 
neglects the fact that HR personnel need to be intimately involved in understanding new 
business requirements.  Outsourcing HR to an independent contractor may severely 
hamper the ability to recruit the kind of multi skilled knowledge workers required to 
support a lean enterprise. 
6 Summary 
Before trying to implement best business practices learned from CHAPTER 2, it is 
necessary to ponder the implications of such a strategy.  CHAPTER 5 started by 
analyzing the lessons from the fruitflies and then focused on organizational and people 
issues.  Learning from the fruitflies, as CHAPTER 5 demonstrated, is especially tricky 
because of customer, value chain integration and exchange model related issues.  
Moreover, an analysis at the organization level is necessary to understand the full impact 
of e-World trends: traditional hierarchical structure are questionable in view of the new 
distribution of knowledge within the firm but political tensions seem inevitable with 
current senior management.  Fially, a focus on people issues highlighted the need to 
adapt reward schedules, enterprise culture and human resources management. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviews the research documented in this thesis.  It first provides a brief 
discussion of the research objectives, key questions and research design.  It then 
summarizes the major findings and discusses possible directions for future research. 
1 Review of research objectives, key questions and research 
design 
The introduction chapter cited Jorgenson and Stiroh’s recent research demonstrating a 
high correlation between labor productivity growth and progress in modern information 
and communication technologies.  Economists may be extremely fastidious but the result 
is far from obvious when one attempts to unders and the nature of this correlation.  This 
thesis concentrated on the interactions between contemporary business models and the 
Lean enterprise.  Following Charles Fine’s logic that slower industries (e.g. Aerospace) 
ultimately follow the same trends as faster ones (e.g. personal computer), CHAPTER 2 
focused on four case studies representative of the e-World.  CHAPTER 3 was a transition 
to Aerospace’s existing e-World ventures and provided a framework for cross industry 
comparisons.  CHAPTER 4 examined in detail the interactions between the e-World and 
the Lean enterprise.  Lastly, CHAPTER 5 provided a broader perspective for industry 
leaders to bear in mind when trying to learn from the fast moving e-World trends of 
CHAPTER 2. 
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2 Summary of major findings 
2.1 E-World principles 
CHAPTER 2 described current e-World trends and focused on four case studies.  From 
these case studies, a set of principles was extracted to form the e-World principles.  Dell 
Corporation’s business model exhibited three major strengths: e-W1 – Sell Directly, e-
W2 – Focus on end-customer, and e-W3 – Integrate the whole supply chain.  Likewise, 
three characteristics were identified from eBay’s business model: e-W4 – Look for 
opportunities to create value, e-W5 – Leverage community effects, and e-W6 – Develop 
a trustful environment.  The third case study analyzed the Linux phenomenon and 
isolated three vital components: e-W7 – treat customers as co-developers, e-W8 – release 
early, release often, and e-W9- Network effects overturn he law of diminishing returns.  
Finally, the Enron case study provided the last three e-World principles: e-W10 – Seek 
the standard status, e-W11 – Build on the exchange model, and e-W12 – Identify and 
concentrate on your core competency. 
2.2 Current situation in the Aerospace industry 
CHAPTER 3 presented the current trends in the Aerospace industries, illustrated by a 
number of companies trying to leverage Internet technologies to conduct business.  This 
chapter observed that Aerospace companies are still in infancy compared to much more 
advanced Dell corporation in the computer industry.  However, since it is easy and 
tempting to draw fast parallels between the Dell model and any other industry, 
CHAPTER 3 demonstrated the importance to keep stakeholder, product and production 
issues in mind before trying to apply any recipe from Dell’s factories. 
2.3 Interactions between e-World and Lean principles 
CHAPTER 4 focused more specifically on the interaction between each of the 12 e-
World principles with the LEM’s 12 overarching principles (OAPs).  First to be noted 
were the similarities and reciprocal reinforcement of e-World and Lean principles.  e-W2 
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and OAP7 both profess the importance of customer focus.  Likewise developing a trustful 
environment is a common characteristic of the e-World and of Lean.  Finally, Dell’s 
supply chain integration strength (e-W3) was identified to be a lan mix of flow 
optimization (OAP1) and integrated product and process development (OAP5).  Second 
to be observed were the inconsistencies between e-World principles and Lean.  Most 
notably conflicting with Lean are eBay’s principle of leveraging community effects (e-
W5) and Linux’s apparent exception to the law of diminishing return (e-W9). 
2.4 Policy issues 
CHAPTER 5 started by analyzing the lessons from the fruitflies and then focused on 
organizational and people issu s. 
The section on fruitfly lessons led to five major conclusions. First, the definition of one’s 
customers is far from trivial in an IT enabled collaborative environment and customer 
data can be technically difficult to manage.  Second, value chain integration faces trust, 
technological, institutional as well as legal challenges.  Third, dynamic pricing and the 
exchange model may not adapt to product and industry complexities.  Fourth, CHAPTER 
5 mentioned the need for special reward systems in order to foster Linux-like altruistic 
work behavior.  Fifth, it recommended to rethink pricing structures for software-loaded 
products. 
The organizational analysis of current e-World trends highlighted two major points. First 
there are some political tensions against the democratizing effect of the Internet that 
industry leaders should be aware of.  Second, companies have to adapt to the new 
distribution of knowledge within their boundaries.  Dramatic changes in training program 
are needed and the role of each rung in the hierarchical chart needs to be well defined.
Finally the section on people implications underlined three main points.  First, the new 
generation necessitates a different reward structure in which employees are interested in 
the profits on their company.  Second the rise of free agents working on specific projects 
for limited time-p riods should be a point of concern for company leaders when they 
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define their enterprise culture.  Third human resources department need a complete 
reorganization.  Training programs and recruiting in the age of IT enabled collaborative 
enterprises should be extended to the whole enterprise and not just limited to one given 
company. 
3 Suggestions for further research 
The result of learning is always an increased awareness of one’s ignorance.  
Unsurprisingly, this thesis concludes with more questions than were considered in the 
introductory chapter.  What should be the next step of this research then? 
Based on the findings of this thesis, the author would recommend several areas for future 
research. 
3.1 Exostar 
As Lou Gerstner, CEO and chairman of IBM mentioned, the real Internet revolution is on 
its way and current plans at Exostar seem to confirm the prediction.  It would thus be 
interesting to not only keep observing the evolution of exchanges such as Exostar and 
MyAircraft for the Aerospace industry, but also to keep an eye on Chemdex in the 
petrochemical industry and Covisint in the automobile industry. 
3.2 Virtual collaboration 
The potential of virtual collaboration is still unclear.  One could argue that, like the 
electricity revolution, professional virtual collaboration needs a new generation to grow 
up with it before human beings can benefit from it.  This thesis identified several 
hindering factors to the construction of online collaboration.  Further research on the 
topic will certainly require a better understanding of human communication and draw 
upon psychology and more specific communication research. 
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Many more areas of research (technology, organization, human behavior etc.) will 
obviously be solicited for supporting evidence before we can understand the whole 
Internet phenomenon.  How long will that take? Considering that the electricity market is 
still evolving considerably today after almost a century since managers started to use it to 
re-organize their factories, wisdom should call for patience. 
3.3 Value creation and the definition of value 
What are future domains of research for a think-tank like the Lean Aerospace Initiative?  
This thesis showed the interaction between e-World trends in fast developing industries 
and the Lean principles.  Among the e-World principles, Dell’s customer focus principle 
(e-W2) and eBay’s new value creation principle (e-W4) raise interesting questions about 
the nature of the value creation process.  Value, in the traditional Lean view, originates 
from a customer pull.  Arguably, Dell’s excellent understanding of its customer’s needs is 
simply a brilliant application of Lean principles.  If it means however, that Dell is able to 
completely anticipate its customer’s needs (refer to case study’s examples demonstrating 
how Dell knows what its customers need even before them), the notion of customer-pull 
become much less trivial.  In some extreme cases, D ll has replaced its client’s entire IT 
department.  The Internet clearly transforms the economics of information and the 
concept of value, which is key to Lean, will certainly require further research. 
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